PRE-REVOLUTION BRITISH NATIONAL MILITIA AND OUR NATIONAL GUARD

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A

PLAN

FOR

ESTABLISHING AND
DISCIPLINING

A

National Militia

IN

GREAT BRITAIN,
IRELAND,

AND

In all the BRITISH DOMINIONS
of AMERICA.

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THE following plan ſuppoſes, that the common ſoldiers of our preſent army ſhall be diſbanded of courſe, when their officers are incorporated with the national militia: becauſe diſbanding them will contribute not only to the public wealth, by adding many more uſeful hands to mechanic arts and huſbandry, but to the improvement of the militia diſcipline, by ſo many expert ſoldiers reſiding in every part of the kingdom. At the ſame time it muſt be the moſt grateful reward of their paſt labours, to releaſe them from the ſanguinary laſhes of martial law; allowing them the privilege of Engliſhmen, to acquire a much better ſubſiſtence, upon the common fruits of induſtry, with a participation of the public liberty.

INTRO-

THE INTRODUCTION;

In anſwer to the general Objections againſt a MILITIA.

HOW well ſoever any government may be conſtituted for internal ſafety, its exiſtence cannot be of long duration, if unprovided with military ſtrength proportionate to its extent and ſituation, and ſufficient to repel external force. Neither riches nor populouſneſs are able to give ſecurity to a nation untrained to arms; for multitudes unskilful in the art of war can defend their poſſeſſions no better than flocks of ſheep

their paſtures. The innumerable, undiſciplined hoſts of Perſia fled before the little veteran army of Macedon. The immenſe riches of that vaſt empire were only temptations to Alexander's ambition, without being the means of its defence.

It is indeed an old maxim, that riches are the ſinews of war; but this is true in no other ſenſe, except for the maintenance and pay of armies, when in the field, and in foreign countries: "in "other reſpects the apothegm * "is falſe; for money cannot "make good ſoldiers. Princes "who rely upon their treaſure as "ſufficient

* See Machiavel, page 345. Fol. Ed.

" ſufficient to defend them, do
" not conſider, that if money
" could have done it Darius
" would have conquer'd Alex-
" ander; the Grecians the Ro-
" mans; and duke Charles the
" Switzers: but they preſuming
" upon the multitude of their
" bags more than the goodneſs
" of their men, were all over-
" come. Crœſus the king of
" Lydia carrying Solon into his
" treaſury, and ſhewing him an
" immenſe quantity of riches,
" asked him what he thought of
" his power; to which the phi-
" loſopher replied, I think it ne-
" ver the greater for this; be-
" cauſe battles are fought more
" with iron than gold; and it

" may happen that ſomebody will
" come with his iron, and take
" it all from you This actu-
" ally happened to the king of
" Macedon, who being upon the
" point of concluding a peace
" with the Gauls, then tranſ-
" planted to Greece, ſhewed their
" ambaſſadors his treaſury full
" of ſilver and gold; which they
" no ſooner had ſeen, but long-
" ing impatiently to be at it,
" broke off the treaty, and ruined
" his country. The Venetians,
" in the meridian of their pro-
" ſperity, had their coffers well
" ſtored, but depending upon
" their money, they loſt all."
And if other nations ſhould truſt their defence to armies of foreign

foreign mercenaries, they cannot hope for better ſucceſs againſt invaders; nor can the paymaſters, whether kings or republicks, ſecure themſelves from becoming a prey to their own hirelings.

The juſt fear of ſuch an event has probably deterred moſt governments from reſting their whole defence upon ſo precarious a bottom; but yet the alternative commonly choſen is a ſecurity very little preferable: for, tho' ſtanding armies ſhould be compoſed of natives, and members of the ſame ſociety, which they are intended to protect, yet whenever they become a diſtinct body of mercenaries, making the profeſſion of

arms the only means of ſubſiſtence, their intereſt is oppoſite to that of the people in general: becauſe war *, tumult and plunder are not leſs ſubverſive of national felicity, than they are the neceſſary means by which mercenary ſoldiers can proſper; beſides, their pay is at beſt a grievous burthen upon public induſtry.

It is very true that many officers of the Britiſh army are men of great fortune, or high quality. All

* A well-conſtituted kingdom or commonwealth will not ſuffer any of their citizens or ſubjects, or any other good men, to make war their profeſſion; for he can never be thought a good man, who takes upon him an employment, by which, if he would reap any profit, he is obliged to be falſe, rapacious, cruel, &c. See Machiavel, chap. 2. page 438.

All theſe have an intereſt in the peace and civil proſperity of this kingdom, ſuperior to their private intereſt as ſoldiers. From ſuch there cannot be much apprehenſion of danger, if ambition, and the luſt of power, are not taken into the conſideration; nor from any others, who retain a true ſenſe of honour, and love for their country. To all theſe my plan cannot be unacceptable, which incorporates the officers of the preſent army with the national militia, allowing them full pay for life, as able maſters, well qualified to teach the art of diſcipline to thoſe corps which they may command; for that ſcheme cements their private with the

public intereſt. This therefore is doing juſtice to them, conſiſtently with prudence and good policy. But to frame an engine for public defence, like a mercenary army, which may probably recoil upon the contrivers, is abſolutely repugnant to both: for what can hinder ſuch an army from enſlaving and deſtroying their fellow-ſubjects unarmed, and undiſciplined, whenever their ambition or wants require it? Thus every government depending upon that ſupport, runs daily the deſperate hazard of being ſubverted by its intended protectors. Numerous exemplifications to this purpoſe are needleſs, ſince antient and modern hiſtory abound

abound with fatal inſtances. The Roman * emperors were often dethroned by thoſe legions which were the inſtruments of their power: the Ottoman empire often ſtruggles

* Octavius firſt, and afterwards Tiberius, (preferring their private power to the public good) began to diſarm the people, (that they might have them more eaſily at command) and to keep ſtanding armies upon the frontiers of their empire. But becauſe they thought them inſufficient to curb the people, and awe the ſenate of Rome, they eſtabliſhed another army, (called the Prætorian) which was quartered always about the city, as if intended for a guard: but when afterwards the emperors permitted them to lay aſide all other profeſſions, and devote themſelves to war, they grew inſolent immediately, and became not only terrible to the ſenate, but pernicious to the emperors; inſomuch, that many of them were put to death by the fury of thoſe ſoldiers, who created and depoſed their emperors as they pleaſed: and ſometimes it fell out that ſeveral emperors were created by ſeveral armies at the ſame time, which occaſioned the diviſion firſt, and by degrees the deſtruction of the empire. See Machiavel, page 440.

ſtruggles under ſuch convulſions: Ruſſia owes its preſent Empreſs to the royal guard of her predeceſſor: and every king or republic, under the ſame circumſtances, is neceſſarily expoſed to the like revolutions.

Nevertheless, to blind the eyes of mankind, and to render mercenary armies leſs ſuſpected and odious, ſtate-craft, for the promotion of lawleſs power, has too often exerciſed its wicked art in perſuading the world, that none but ſuch are capable of defending nations againſt foreigners of the ſame ſort: and proſtitute wit, ever fawning upon power for the ſake of luxury, has without

out ſhame joined in the general ridicule of a militia, and flattered the mercenary ſoldier; as if * a pitiful daily pay, ſpent in debauchery, and a particular dreſs, were the only means of inſpiring bravery, and ſupporting diſcipline. But neither the varniſh of

* From the hiſtory of the Romans it may be obſerved, how unſafe it is to commit the defence of our affairs to a mercenary army, who have nothing to encourage them but a pitiful pay, which is not conſiderable enough to make them ſo faithful as to lay down their lives in your quarrel: for if an army is not bound to the perſon for whom they fight by particular obligations, ſuch as the defence of their country, poſterity and religion, they will not exert their courage: ſo that it is neceſſary for every king, who deſires to defend himſelf well, to train up his ſubjects in military diſcipline, that he may ſafely depend upon them in time of diſtreſs: and this has been the practice of all thoſe who have done any great things. See Machiavel, page 312.

of one, nor the raillery of the other, ought to prejudice mankind againſt plain and obvious truth; tho' it is too evident, that they have been amazingly ſucceſsful in eſtabliſhing mercenary armies all over Europe, except in Switzerland: for what are called the militia of France, Spain, Italy and Sweden, are but different kinds of mercenary armies; all kept in pay of ſome ſort, and ſubject to martial law.

It is not however my deſign to enter formally into a minute diſcuſſion of the point, how far a national militia is preferable in every reſpect to a mercenary army; for, that the following plan will clearly

clearly evince: It ſhall therefore be my endeavour in this place to ſhew as conciſely as poſſible, that no mercenary army, which this kingdom can ſupport without becoming bankrupt, is ſufficient for its ſecurity againſt foreign invaſion; and yet a national militia is capable of defending it with great certainty, and little expence.

EVERY one moderately skilled in the revenues of this nation, mortgaged to future generations, and ſtrained ſo high by exceſſive taxes, fees at firſt glance, that beſides the neceſſary expence of the navy, and all the other charges of government, grown exorbitant by

by the luxury of courtiers, it is not poſſible to ſupport long the preſent army without ruin; much leſs is it able to maintain a greater number: but yet, if a mercenary army of an hundred thouſand men were quartered equally near our ſea-coaſts, at leaſt eighteen hundred miles in circumference, it is hardly credible that five thouſand of them could be muſtered at any one place, with expedition enough to prevent a ſudden invaſion. And if an enemy once gain footing in a country like ours, deſtitute of fortified towns, what ravages may not be committed upon a people unarmed, before a number of mercenaries could

could be drawn together ſufficient to ſtop the devaſtation?

But a national militia (ſuch as that of Great Britain might be) conſiſting of two millions cantoned without expence in their uſual habitations all over this kingdom, will be infinitely ſuperior in every place where an enemy may land, to any number which can be tranſported over the ſea at once: and therefore, without the aid of our fleets, ſuch a militia well-diſciplined is able, not only to defend us from invaſion, but to ſecure us from the inſult of any neighbour, or even the united powers of the continent. Feints or threats of that

that kind, which now alarm, and obſtruct the neceſſary operations of war, could not under ſuch an happy circumſtance give the leaſt interruption to the public tranquillity; nor ſo much as ſuſpend any man's ordinary buſineſs, even in the places moſt expoſed, when every one knows himſelf provided with arms and skill, and is ſure of being joined at the ſhorteſt warning by others as well qualified as himſelf, and in numbers ſufficient to repel any attempt that can be made.

It is far from my intention to undervalue the importance of the Britiſh navy; for certainly it is the glory, and no leſs at preſent

the

the bulwark of this kingdom, as it muſt always continue to be the only ſafeguard of its navigation and commerce. But were a national militia well eſtabliſhed and diſciplined, and by that means our coaſts abſolutely ſecured from all invaſion, no part of the navy need be detained in port; where, even in that caſe, it might become uſeleſs by contrary winds; but the whole might act with redoubled force upon the coaſts of our enemies.

Under ſuch circumſtances this iſland, inſtead of wanting alliances upon the continent, muſt be courted by every power fearful of oppreſſion. No perfidy, ſlug-

giſhneſs, or ſelfiſh views of allies, could ſhake our political reſolves, or force us to the intolerable expence of ſubſidies for the ſupport of foreign troops: nor could the neutrality of thoſe we now depend upon moſt for aſſiſtance, retard our operations, or compel us to any unjuſt or diſhonourable peace, for the extenſion of their commerce, upon the ruins of our trade and navigation.

Such a body of armed men, as this iſland might furniſh, more numerous than all the mercenaries of Europe in conjunction, would not only be able to protect it againſt any oppoſition, but at all times, and on the moſt ſud-

den

den occaſions, to avenge its injuries upon any power of the continent, with more force, and better ſoldiers, becauſe freemen, than can be furniſhed by the united mercenaries of France and Spain. His Majeſty might then raiſe upon the moſt ſudden emergency an army of volunteers well diſciplined, to man his fleets, (ſo far as landmen can be ſerviceable) or for any foreign expedition; who, as ſoon as the occaſion of their taking arms ceaſed, would return to their habitations and * em-

* Thoſe kings, who deſire to live in ſafety and peace, ought to have their armies compoſed of ſuch perſons, as when there is a neceſſity of war, will take up arms freely for the defence of their country; and when peace is concluded, will as readily acquieſce, and return to their old habitations and callings. See Machiavel, page 441.

ployments, without further burthen to the public, or diſadvantage to themſelves.

SUCH a land-force, added to the maritime ſtrength of Great Britain, muſt render it the terror of its enemies, and the ſafe-guard of Europe. Our monarch would then indeed hold the balance of power: not only the moſt diſtant territories of Britain, but his Majeſty's foreign dominions alſo, and whatever ſtate he pleaſes to favour, might reſt in perfect tranquillity, when no potentate of Europe would dare to offend ſo mighty a power, as a nation populous like ours, and well trained to arms. For Britain,

tain, as a free ſtate, has this advantage over the abſolute monarchies of Europe, that it may truſt ſafely all its ſubjects with arms, whereas thoſe cannot *. In regard to what is feared by ſome, leſt any among the rabble might excite them to make uſe of their arms to the diſturbance of the public peace, I truſt the following plan effectually provides againſt every evil of that ſort, and will therefore diſſipate all ſuch apprehenſions.

It is needleſs to ſay more in favour of a national militia, ſince it already appears evidently to be a much better means of ſecurity

* See Machiavel, P. 444. Fol. Ed. 3d.

againſt invaſion, than any mercenary army which we are able to ſupport; but if the two inſtitutions were conſidered with regard to the preſervation of public liberty, the former ſurpaſſes the latter beyond all compariſon; ſo far, that to prove the preference by a long train of arguments, ſeems diſtruſting the common ſenſe of mankind.

NEVERTHELESS ſome play-writers, and many ſtate-witlings, have taken frequent occaſions of ridiculing a militia in general, under the falſe colours of the particular nominal militia of London. But tho' a band of porters, (the ſubſtitutes of indo-

lence)

lence) badly armed, and not at all diſciplined, are fit objects of ridicule, becauſe making a ſhew of what they really are not; will therefore a regular, well-diſciplined militia be ſo too? What ſays the witling to the militia of Switzerland, the only army properly called a militia in all Europe? Is that a ridiculous army, which, without barrier towns, and bordering upon the greateſt potentates of the continent, have preſerved their country free, and in profound tranquillity, with reſpect to foreign invaſion, for more than two centuries? Thirteen hundred of this militia routed the arch-duke Leopold's army at the

battle of Morgarten *, and killed above twice their own number of the enemy. In the battle of Sampach, where the ſame archduke loſt his life, twenty thouſand of his mercenary forces were defeated by ſixteen hundred of thoſe Switzers. At Weſen, in the canton of Glaris, three hundred and fifty of this † militia won

* See page 212 of Stanyan's account of Switzerland.

† Mr Stanyan, in his account of Switzerland, runs a parallel between theſe three battles, and thoſe ſurprizing acts of valour performed by the Grecians againſt the mighty armies of Darius and Xerxes, at Marathon, Thermopylæ, and Platæa. "The battle "of Weſen (ſays he) may not only be com- "pared to that of Thermopylæ, but ſeems "to be a copy of it that exceeded the ori- "ginal: for as 300 Spartans attacked the "Perſians at that narrow paſs, and all pe- "riſhed in the attempt; ſo 350 Switzers "not

won the field of battle from a regular army of eight thouſand Auſtrians. Not that theſe were men of leſs natural courage; for the Auſtrian bravery has been often ſignalized by victory, when as mercenaries they fought againſt mercenaries; but when for a paultry pay they invaded the natural rights of a brave free people formed into a regular militia, and fighting in defence of their country,

" not only attacked in ſuch another paſs an " army of eight thouſand Auſtrians, but " gained the field of battle. Eleven pillars, " (the monuments of this victory) are now " to be ſeen in that glorious field, to mark " the place where the Switzers rallied: for " their hiſtory ſays, that they were repulſed " ten times, but rallying the eleventh, broke " the enemy's army, and put them to flight " with great ſlaughter." See page 212, and 213.

try, the Auſtrians were not able to ſtand before them.

Not to draw more proofs from other nations, by the annals of our own country it appears, that the atchievements of mercenary armies, even in foreign wars, are not to be compared with the famous victories of Creſſy, Poictiers, and Azincourt *, won by our Britiſh kings at the head of their

* The late duke of Marlborough's victories are juſtly celebrated, as illuſtrious monuments of Britiſh glory, but yet not to be compared with theſe, becauſe not atchieved at ſo great a diſparity of numbers, and other diſadvantageous circumſtances.

It is remarkable, that nine of the greateſt military exploits recorded in hiſtory were performed (not by mercenary armies, but) by well trained militias, at Marathon, Thermopylæ, Platæa, Morgarten, Sampach, Weſen, Creſſy, Poictiers, and Azincourt.

their militias. Henry the eighth, not ſo renowned as Edward and his ſon for military proweſs, invaded France with a militia, "and "tho' the Engliſh had no wars "for thirty years, nor officers "nor ſoldiers who had ever ſeen "a battle, they attacked and "vanquiſhed the French, whoſe "officers were excellent, and "ſoldiers very good, by being "trained for ſeveral years toge-"ther in the Italian wars *." Hath not Britain ſtill as many brave men as ever? How much therefore to blame are thoſe in power, who neglecting to eſtabliſh a national militia, made invincible by good diſcipline, expoſe their country

* See Machiavel, page 293.

country to deſtruction, by rejecting the only infallible means of its ſafety? How worthy of public reſentment are all thoſe gentlemen of fortune, who from motives of mere indolence ſhould grudge their perſonal ſervice to the militia, though it would be much leſs labour than their common recreations, or field ſports, and much leſs exerciſe, than is neceſſary, even for the preſervation of health? What will ſuch gentlemen think of themſelves, when reduced by invaſion and conqueſt to a ſtate of wretched poverty, and to a ſlaviſh dependance on the will of a tyrannical conqueror, under the influence of a rapacious, inſatiable, domineering

neering clergy? A fate not unmeet for thoſe, who neglecting the neceſſary means of ſafety in their power, ſacrifice the public liberty with their own happineſs, and that of poſterity, to a ſhort temporary indulgence of ſloth and idleneſs.

To what purpoſe are all the powers of rhetoric * and argument ſo often employed againſt the expence, and great danger of a mercenary army, if a better means of public defence is not propoſed, nor ſubſtituted in its room? For a defence againſt external force there muſt be of ſome ſort

* Ad ſummam rerum noſtrarum pertinere arbitror, ut cogitetis magis, quid agendum nobis, quam quid loquendum ſit. Liv.

ſort or other. Perhaps the difficulty of contriving a commodious militia-ſcheme for a government ſo extenſive as ours, or the dryneſs of a ſubject incapable of yielding pleaſure to the imagination, or rather the repugnancy of it to the private intereſt, and ſiniſter views of ſtateſmen and ſoldiers, who are beſt qualified to plan it, hath hitherto prevented the undertaking: if therefore many defects appear in this now ſubmitted to public conſideration, the author believes himſelf excuſable, and will think his labour amply recompenced, if it excites a more skilful hand to correct his errors, or to communicate a more perfect plan; ſuch as may induce

his

his Majeſty and the Parliament to eſtabliſh by law a national and well-diſciplined militia, by which the honour of the crown may be exalted to the higheſt degree of ſplendor, and the freedom, ſafety, and happineſs of this nation ſecured abſolutely againſt all the attempts of its moſt envious or ambitious neighbours.

A

PLAN

FOR A

National Militia

IN

GREAT-BRITAIN, &c.

PART I.

IN the idea of a national militia I comprehend the military ſervice of all men capable of bearing arms, from the age of 18 to that of 50 years; except ſuch as may be exempted by law; ſuppoſe all members of both houſes, during the ſeſſions of parliament; the king's moſt honourable privy council; all the judges, officers of the houſhold, treaſury, exchequer, admiralty, and navy board; all counſel-

Part I. lors at law, ſollicitors, and attorneys, during the terms or aſſizes; all juſtices of the peace, and other peace-officers, during their grand and petty ſeſſions, and the time of the reſpective county-aſſizes; all phyſicians, and the whole body of the clergy.

In a right inſtitution of this kind no military tyranny ought to be practiſed; nor need any man be obliged to more than a few hours exerciſe between the riſing and ſetting of the ſun once a month: no corporal puniſhment ſhould be inflicted, but all military diſcipline encouraged by example and rewards, or inforced by pecuniary fines.

It is equally neceſſary to obviate all oppreſſions whatſoever. Therefore thoſe who are incapacitated by bodily infirmity, tho' within the military age, ought to be excuſed upon due proof made thereof before the military officers of the diſtrict where ſuch perſons are reſident.

ſident. However, in regard to all thoſe, Part I.
who on account of their religious principles are not ſafely to be truſted with arms, (as papiſts under a proteſtant government,) likewiſe all ſuch, who (as the quakers) ſcruple, on account of conſcience, the uſe of arms, it is reaſonable they ſhould pay ſuch an additional tax, as may be a juſt equivalent for their perſonal ſervice. Again, the pooreſt ſort of people, who ſubſiſt by daily labour, may be exerciſed for an hour or two, after the example of the Swiſs, on ſundays only, before or after divine ſervice at their reſpective pariſh churches, by quarter parts each ſunday.

Nor let this be judged by the over-righteous a profanation of the day ſet apart for religious purpoſes; ſince ſelf-preſervation is the firſt law of God, given as well for the defence of nations, as of each individual, and not to be exerciſed any other way ſo effectually, as by military diſcipline. Is not this exer-

Part I. ciſe as innocent as any of thoſe amuſements generally permitted on the ſabbath, much more conducive to the publick good, and to the preſervation of the proteſtant religion, againſt the open aſſaults of popery? Perhaps a better means cannot be deviſed to fruſtrate even the ſecret machinations of jeſuitical miſſionaries in the work of converſion, than by making it the duty of all the common people to attend the publick worſhip on ſundays, when they may be inſtructed both in the true principles of the proteſtant religion, and in the arts of diſcipline, by which only it can be defended againſt a powerful, bigotted adverſary.

Upon theſe principles is formed the following plan, which is ſubmitted to the conſideration, correction, and improvement of every Briton better verſed in the military art.

SECT.

SECT. I.

Prop. 1. *That all the men of Great Britain, from* 18 *to* 50 *years old, capable of bearing arms, (not exempted by law, or diſqualified) be form'd into a regular and well-diſciplin'd militia; and that the militia of each county be eſtabliſh'd as the army of that county, never to march out of its limits, except to the aid of ſome neighbour county, and the king in perſon, or by his ſign manual to the lord lieutenant, ſhall ſo appoint.*

THUS all being injoined the like ſervice, no one can complain of partiality, and theſe limitations at once ſecure the people from being haraſſed and fatigued by unneceſſary marches, and the crown from all attempts of inſurrection, or diſquiet from the ambition of the moſt factious leaders. Indeed, where all are arm'd, every mover of riot and ground-

Part I. leſs diſturbance muſt ſoon meet his juſt reward, ſince the majority of men deſire peace and order; and, whenever they have power, will exert their joint endeavours to preſerve it.

SECT. II.

Prop. 2. *That the militia of each county be divided into two branches, viz. the ſuperior militia compoſed altogether of men of property, and the ſubordinate militia of the common people.*

THIS arrangement of the militia into diſtinct claſſes, is a further ſecurity to the king and people, and a more effectual defence of both: for, as the ſuperior militia are men of property, who will naturally fight moſt vigorouſly in defence of it, ſo it is intended by this plan, that they ſhould be the only ſoldiers form'd into battalions, and intruſted with their own arms, becauſe leſs prone to inſurrection, and any tumultuous

multuous disturbance, which may render that property precarious. On the contrary, such men are ever most ready and willing, for their own sake, to suppress the tumults, which are sometimes fomented in a free government, by men of desperate fortune among the rabble. Sect. 3.

SECT. III.

Prop. 3. *That the superior militia be divided into two branches, cavalry and infantry.*

This subdivision is necessary under the present management of war: for a numerous cavalry is the most proper defence of an open country, where, by quick movements, it may harass and distress an enemy every step of their march. Upon this circumstance, perhaps, the late duke of Marlborough founded his opinion, (if the tradition of his saying so is true) that the security of England consisted in the multitude of its horsemen.

Part I.

SECT. IV.

Prop. 4. *That the cavalry of ſuperior militia be form'd out of the nobility and gentry, at their own expence, and be called the light-horſe, well train'd in both exerciſes of horſe and foot. Every man, not exempted by law, ſhall roll in this cavalry, who is worth* 6000 *l. in money, or poſſeſſed of* 300 *l. per annum, or upwards, in fee ſimple, copy-hold, leaſe-hold, or eſtate for life in ſome part of the Britiſh dominions. Each troop is to chuſe its own officers annually by ballot; and thoſe officers, when incorporated into regiments of the hundreds, are to chuſe their reſpective field-officers by ballot: The king ſtill retaining the power of appointing general officers annually out of all the field-officers ſo choſen, both of horſe and foot. The younger ſons and brothers of all perſons ſo qualified, when of age to bear arms, are permitted to roll*

roll with their fathers or brothers of the ſuperior cavalry, provided they are as well mounted and accouter'd in the ſame uniform: but if not inrolled there, all ſuch are obliged to liſt in the infantry of the ſuperior militia, by virtue of their fathers or brothers qualifications, and to do duty accordingly. Sect. 4.

By this propoſition the nobility and gentry of the beſt fortunes are form'd into a body of light-horſe in each county, as well for their own eaſe in accoutrements, as for the ſafety of the kingdom; ſince by that means they can with more expedition march to the enemy at landing, and encounter them either as horſe or foot, as may be moſt advantageous.

That a well-conſtituted militia ſhould chuſe their own officers up to the rank of generals, is highly reaſonable, becauſe the choice will naturally fall upon men of the beſt character, from whom there is no fear of injuſtice, or military oppreſſion:

Part I. oppreſſion: and as the ballot prevents all reſentments, ſo the choice for one year only, will keep all officers within the bounds of moderation and decorum in the exerciſe of military power: nor can the honour of the crown ſuffer any diminution, while his majeſty retains the ſole power of appointing generals over each county, out of the field-officers choſen by the body of officers, who are the beſt judges of their neighbours characters, and will therefore elect the ableſt men in point of morals, education, and fortune.

THUS the rights of the crown, and the liberty of the people may be preſerv'd in perfect ſafety; and what can give more ſpirit and martial vigour to an army of gentlemen, than to be led by thoſe of whom they have the beſt opinion?

To form a militia of light cavalry out of the nobility and gentry, each being worth 300 l. per annum and upwards,

or

or 6000 l. in money, at their own charge, can be no increaſe of expence to people of that rank; becauſe all ſuch keep horſes for health, convenience, or equipage, which, with a little attention to ſize and colour, may anſwer all military purpoſes: and I appeal to the ſenſe of every gentleman, whether ſome part of the expence at preſent beſtowed on hounds and race-horſes may not be apply'd more to the publick advantage in the military way, and be at the ſame time a more manly, graceful exerciſe. Sect. 4.

CUSTOM, which has given a ſanction to ſuch profitleſs amuſements, attended with immenſe expence, will, upon the eſtabliſhment of a national militia, ſoon juſtify a more commendable employment. A military ſpirit will then actuate every gentleman to rival his neighbour in the accompliſhments of a good officer, eſpecially if thoſe of the higheſt rank and character will ſet the example with ſteadineſs and vigour.

BUT

Part I.

But as the notion of order is generally annexed to uniformity of dreſs, accoutrements, and colour of horſes; I would recommend a plain ſcarlet dreſs with gilt buttons, a gold laced hat, and light boots, for the habit of the ſuperior cavalry; for the accoutrements, ſuch ſaddles as our horſe-officers now uſe, with plain ſcarlet furniture; a light carbine and piſtols of muſquet bore; the horſes of 15 hands high, like our ſtrong ſized hunters, and of a bay colour, as the moſt common and moſt eaſily collected.

This ſimilarity may perhaps be thought unneceſſary, as it is only an imitation of the preſent cuſtom of the ſoldiery in a point not eſſential. But as this uniformity of dreſs is the general practice of the armies of Europe, it is a circumſtance, that deſerves conſideration; for we know what effects faſhion and opinion, however arbitrary, have upon

upon men. Their enemies will probably entertain higher notions of ſuch an army, and their friends receive more pleaſure from the appearance. Therefore as the uniformity of dreſs and accoutrements is not more expenſive than the contrary, I would recommend it as a poſitive injunction in the act of militia; but more eſpecially in the arms of horſe and foot, becauſe if all are not exactly of the ſame bore *, the cartridges Sect. 4.

* It may not be improper here to correct an error in common practice, even among our regular forces, viz. that of making cartridges with too heavy a load of powder, which do leſs execution, and hurt our ſoldiers by the recoil of their arms. To remedy this defect therefore it is propoſed, that exact care be taken to fill all cartridges with no more powder than is ſufficient to give the ball good force without recoil in the exploſion, which I apprehend may be done with one fourth part of the weight of ball, if the powder is good. In like manner, the niceſt care ought to be taken in caſting bullets ſo much leſs than the bore, that they may ſlip down with eaſe, when rolled in cartridges, even into a foul gun: for, if both theſe regulations are not obſerv'd with accuracy, fatal defeats may happen to armies in the heat of action, by a great number of men and arms becoming abſolutely uſeleſs.

Part I. tridges provided by the publick muſt be uſeleſs to a great part of the army.

SECT. V.

Prop. 5. *That the infantry of the ſuperior militia be alſo form'd of men of property, at their own expence; viz. all men worth* 50 *l. per annum, or upwards, (but under* 300 *l. per annum) of any kind of eſtate in the Britiſh dominions: all ſuch as are worth in money or chattels five hundred pounds; all thoſe who rent an houſe or lands to the value of* 50 *l. per annum, or upwards, to* 300 *l. The ſons alſo of all men thus qualified, when of age to bear arms, are entitled to liſt in the infantry of the ſuperior militia, if they think fit to comply with the uniform; but if not, they are obliged to do duty in the ſubordinate militia of the pariſh where they reſide. Every company of the ſuperior militia is to chuſe its own offi-*

cers

cers by ballot, and when form'd into a regiment of the hundred, thoſe officers to chuſe the field-officers out of their own corps by ballot. The king appoints general officers annually over the foot, in like manner, as before ſpecified in the generals of the horſe. No diſtinction to be made in the dreſs of officers, except the ſcarf or ſaſh, but all to wear the ſame uniform eſtabliſhed by act of parliament for horſe or foot. Sect. 5.

THE reaſons offer'd in ſupport of the firſt propoſition, are in general applicable to this. Little therefore need be added here, but with reſpect to the uniform of dreſs and accoutrements. In the former caſe, I would recommend only a plain blue cloath coat trim'd with gilt buttons, an hat laced with a gold lace of an inch broad, and white linen gaiters. As to arms and accoutrements, better cannot be deſired than thoſe now in the hands

Part I. hands of our regular foot ſoldiers, either for ſize or uſe: and therefore it is to be wiſhed, that all the arms for the national militia were deliver'd from the tower of the ſame bore, and the weapons of the ſame ſize; that every man entitled to roll in the horſe or foot of the ſuperior militia, may be obliged to provide himſelf from thence, at a certain moderate price, and of real goodneſs.

To admit no diſtinction of dreſs between the officers and ſoldiers of the militia, except the ſcarf or ſaſh, ſeems agreeable both to oeconomy and good policy; for by that means all officers may ſave the needleſs expence of gaudy clothes, and be more ſecure in the day of battle, when the enemy cannot diſtinguiſh them at a diſtance from other men of the corps.

SECT. VI.

Prop. 6. *That the cavalry of the ſubordinate militia be compoſed wholly of*

of noblemen's and gentlemen's ſervants, or petty tenants not qualified to roll in the horſe or foot of the ſuperior militia. All theſe to be well mounted, arm'd, and accouter'd, as our regular horſe now are, but in uniform blue, faced with red, and trim'd with white metal buttons. The ſubordinate cavalry to march, exerciſe, and be diſmiſſed, at the ſame time and place with the ſuperior cavalry of the ſame diſtrict, who are always to have precedence, or the poſt of honour. Every perſon worth 500 *l. per annum in any kind of eſtate in Great Britain, or ten thouſand pounds in money, ſhall be obliged to furniſh one able-bodied man completely mounted, arm'd, and accouter'd, to this inferior order of heavy cavalry: every man worth* 1000 *l. per annum, or* 20,000 *l. in money, ſhall furniſh two ſuch troopers, and ſo on in proportion to* Sect. 6.

the extent of his eſtate, at his own expence.

THE ſubordinate cavalry compoſed in the manner preſcribed by this propoſition, will make a very large body of heavy cavalry for every county in the kingdom, with little or no additional expence to men of ſuch fortune as are obliged to furniſh them: for, as all gentlemen of 500 l. per annum and upwards, keep ſervants and horſes, it is eaſy to equip his troopers in proper livery, and mount them upon coach-horſes which generally are, and always may be of a proper ſize, and black colour, fit for heavy cavalry. Thus an idle ſet of people, kept too often as the trappings of grandeur, may ſerve all the preſent purpoſes, and become a moſt uſeful order of ſoldiers, by meeting and performing in the ſeveral diſtricts all the neceſſary exerciſes of heavy cavalry, in a diſtinct regiment, once every month, upon

upon the day when their maſters of the ſuperior cavalry do the ſame duty. Sect. 7.

Let the landed men of Great Britain conſider, beſides the national advantage of ſuch an inſtitution, whether it is not a more graceful appearance to ſee a gentleman of ample fortune attended to the field of military exerciſe by five or ſix ſervants well mounted, arm'd and accouter'd, than to view ſo many drones at his heels in queſt of an hare: as to purſue and hunt down an inſolent, ambitious invader, is more glorious than to unkennel, or kill a fox.

SECT. VII.

Prop. 7. *That the infantry of the ſubordinate militia be form'd of the common people. Theſe, tho' eſtabliſhed into companies under officers choſen annually by themſelves out of the ſuperior militia, in the way of ballot, and to be exerciſed every Sunday by quarter parts, according*

Part I.

to the captain's appointment in each parish; yet are not to be regimented, but to act as independent companies within the limits of their respective parishes; except in case of invasion, or as pioneers to the camp of the superior militia. In such cases, these companies may be form'd into regiments by the king's order, upon the same plan with the superior militia, to whom they are always to yield precedence, or the post of honour.

Since few men in the kingdom, capable of bearing arms, are so very poor, as to be unable to provide a spare coat of some cheap and durable colour, in which to perform their military exercises; especially as such a coat being in use once a month only, will last many years; and whoever pleases may make his usual habit of that colour: therefore I propose, that each man of the inferior infantry be cloathed in a uniform blue or

green

green coat with white metal buttons, Sect. 7.
which may ſerve for a Sunday, and mi-
litary dreſs. But becauſe people of the
loweſt claſs cannot generally ſpare ſo
much money as will purchaſe arms and
accoutrements, it is reaſonable that all
theſe ſhould be furniſhed at the nation's
expence.

When therefore the ſubordinate mi-
litia is exactly enrolled into companies
throughout every pariſh of the kingdom,
and each company has choſen a captain,
lieutenant and enſign out of the ſuperior
militia, the government may ſend to every
captain for each man ſo enrolled, a good
fire-lock, bayonet, broad-ſword, pouch,
belts, &c. marked with the name of the
pariſh for which they are appointed;
and the captain for the time being may
paſs his receipt, with a promiſe to keep
them ſafe and in good order, for the uſe
of the company.

Part I.

In like manner each captain is to take the ſame kind of receipt from his ſucceſſor; and during every captain's poſſeſſion of the arms, each is to be allow'd an armourer to keep them clean, and in good order, at the expence of the government. Each armourer may be an experienced ſerjeant or corporal, allow'd full pay for that purpoſe, and to aſſiſt the officers in diſciplining the ſoldiers every Sunday.

PART

PART II.

THE different branches, into which it is here propoſed to divide the national militia, and in what part each member of the commonwealth is to be ranked, being thus explained; it now remains to conſider, how theſe may be ſeverally formed into regiments, and trained. And herein we ſhall endeavour to comply, as near as may be, with the regulations eſtabliſhed by the preſent acts of militia.

SECT. I.

The form of eſtabliſhing the infantry of the ſuperior militia.

1. THAT the lord lieutenant of each county be authorized and required to appoint a deputy for each hundred in his juriſdiction, who under ſuitable penalties ſhall be obliged by law to do the duties of that office for three years at leaſt.

Part II.

2. THAT the deputy lieutenant of each hundred be authorized and required, at a certain day of the year, (ſuppoſe the firſt Monday after Chriſtmas) to iſſue his warrants under hand and ſeal to the high conſtable of the hundred, requiring him to cauſe all perſons reſident in each pariſh, within his diſtrict, and qualified (as in propoſition the 5th) for the infantry of the ſuperior militia to meet on the Sunday following at their reſpective pariſh churches; and there, after morning ſervice, to enter, or enroll their names in a book kept for that purpoſe, in preſence of the miniſter and churchwardens for the time being, under the penalty of forfeiting five pounds each. And the miniſters and churchwardens, under the like forfeiture, are required to examine into, and determine the qualification of each perſon to be enrolled, to ſee his name enter'd, and to make return thereof under

der their hands within ten days, to the deputy lieutenant of the hundred, describing each person's qualifications, and annexing it to his name: and also in the same roll to make a separate column, containing the names of all persons resident in each parish, who are qualified to serve in the infantry of superior militia, and have refused or neglected to list in the same: and also the names of all papists and quakers resident in each parish, are to be distinguished in another separate column, that a due course be taken to levy fines upon delinquents, and to oblige quakers and papists to pay the legal tax appointed in lieu of personal military service. Sect. I.

3. That the minister and churchwardens of each parish be obliged to summon each person, when his name is enrolled at their respective churches, to appear there the Sunday following at noon, to chuse by ballot a captain, lieutenant, and ensign for the company of the

Part II. the ſuperior infantry of that pariſh out of the perſons ſo enrolled.

4. THAT on the day ſo appointed the miniſter and church-wardens of each pariſh ſhall attend to take the votes in a ballot-box fixed for that purpoſe at the pariſh charge, in ſome open place of parade, near or in the church-yard, where each voter ſhall put in his roll of paper, inſcribed with the names of ſuch perſons of the pariſh whom he thinks beſt qualified to ſerve as captain, lieutenant, and enſign of the company. And when all the voters have put in the perſon's name whom they chuſe for captain, the box ſhall be open'd by the miniſter and church-wardens, in preſence of the electors, and that perſon declared and enrolled captain, upon whom moſt nominations fall. In like manner the votes ſhall be taken for the lieutenant, and then for the enſign: and all perſons ſo elected into military offices ſhall ſerve the

the ſame, under the penalty to be pre- Sect. 1.
ſcribed by law.

5. When the officers of each pariſh are thus choſen, their names ſhall be immediately prefixed to the muſter-roll of the ſuperior infantry, in the pariſh-book kept for that purpoſe, and an exact return made thereof to the deputy-lieutenant of the hundred; who ſhall alſo be obliged to enter the ſame into a bound book, diſtinguiſhing the company of each pariſh in his diſtrict, whether cavalry or infantry of the ſuperior or ſubordinate militia, with the names of their reſpective officers prefixed to the roll of each company. And when all the companies of his diſtrict are completely enrolled, and form'd into a regiment of the hundred, with the field-officers names prefixed, the deputy-lieutenant ſhall make a fair copy of the muſter-roll, and return it under his hand and ſeal to the lord lieutenant of the county for the time being, to be by him preſented to his

Part II. his majeſty for his appointment of general officers.

6. So ſoon as the company of ſuperior infantry of each pariſh in his diſtrict is enrolled, the deputy-lieutenant of each hundred ſhall iſſue his warrant to the high conſtable, to cauſe all perſons ſo inliſted, and elected officers, to meet completely arm'd, and accouter'd in the uniform required by law, on the firſt Monday in the following month in the morning, at a certain time and place to be by him appointed, neareſt the centre of the hundred, there to chuſe field-officers for the regiment of the hundred by ballot, which may be executed with eaſe in the following manner.

SECT. II.

The manner of electing field-officers by ballot.

The companies of ſuperior Infantry in each hundred being drawn up by their deputy-

puty-lieutenant into one battalion, all the officers ſhall be commanded by him to take their poſts at the front; and beginning at the right, he ſhall demand of each officer his vote for a colonel to be choſen out of that corps of officers, whoſe name being inſcribed in a paper rolled up, ſhall be kept in his hat till all have ballotted. Then the officers of the corps being muſter'd in a circle, ſhall ſee him examine, and compute fairly on whom the moſt nominations do fall; and that point being agreed, the ſaid deputy-lieutenant ſhall proclaim the perſon ſo choſen colonel of the batallion for that year. Sect. 2.

THE colonel being thus elected, ſhall appoint an adjutant out of his ſubaltern officers, and command him to take the votes in the ſame manner for a lieutenant-colonel, and major for that year, whoſe names, when elected, ſhall be alſo proclaim'd to the battalion.

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Part II.

ALL the field-officers being thus choſen by ballot, they ſhall begin, by the colonel's command, to exerciſe in turns the battalion, on the firſt Monday in every month throughout the year, in every part of diſcipline, either in platoons or otherwiſe, in the moſt open and convenient part of the hundred, as the colonels of horſe and foot think fit to appoint; which ſhall be the place of rendezvous, or poſt of alarm, in all caſes of emergency.

THUS the infantry of the ſuperior militia may be eſtabliſhed all over this kingdom, without much trouble, inconvenience, or expence: and it is firſt choſen in this plan; becauſe if men of fortune, their ſons or brothers, in their reſpective diſtricts are elected foot-officers, they are not obliged to any perſonal ſervice in the cavalry, and may therefore ſave the expence of thoſe accoutrements.

SECT.

Sect. 3.

SECT. III.

The manner of eſtabliſhing the cavalry of the ſuperior militia.

THE ſubſequent Sunday after the infantry of ſuperior militia have choſen their field-officers, all perſons qualified for the ſuperior cavalry, (as in propoſition the 4th) are to be ſummoned to enroll their names, and chuſe their officers in like manner.

AT the ſame time when gentlemen of the ſuperior cavalry enroll their own names, the miniſter and church-wardens ſhall require them to enroll the names of thoſe troopers, whom they are to furniſh to the ſubordinate cavalry, in proportion to their eſtates or fortunes; and in caſe any gentleman neglects or refuſes ſo to do, the deputy-lieutenant upon certificate thereof ſhall levy the fines required by law from ſuch delinquents.

As

Part II.

As this body of militia is to be light cavalry, it ought to be train'd to both exerciſes of horſe and foot, upon the firſt Monday in every month, upon the ſame ground with the infantry of ſuperior militia, which ſhall be agreed and appointed by the colonels of both corps.

SECT. IV.

The manner of eſtabliſhing the heavy cavalry of ſubordinate militia.

On the ſame day when the ſuperior cavalry meet to elect field-officers, the inferior cavalry ſhall be ſummon'd by the deputy-lieutenant of the hundred to meet at the ſame place, where, after the election of the ſuperior cavalry is ended, the ſubordinate cavalry ſhall proceed to the choice of a captain, lieutenant, and cornet out of the ſuperior cavalry of the ſame diſtrict by ballot; and the officers ſo choſen ſhall immediately elect by ballot field-officers out of their own

own corps; and then, being drawn up into a diſtinct battalion, ſhall perform all the neceſſary exerciſe of heavy horſe, on the firſt Monday in every month, at the ſame place where the ſuperior cavalry perform their exerciſe: and, as the ſuperior militia has always precedence, or the poſt of honour, ſo the officers of the ſuperior militia always command thoſe of the inferior, when in camp, or form'd into an army. Sect. 5.

SECT. V.

The manner of eſtabliſhing the infantry of ſubordinate militia.

THE infantry of the ſubordinate militia, compoſed of the common people in every pariſh of the kingdom, may be next enrolled, and eſtabliſhed into companies, under the ſame privilege of chuſing by ballot a captain, lieutenant, and enſign, for each company, out of the ſuperior infantry; provided their choice falls upon ſuch as have not been

Part II. elected officers before. Theſe, as above limited, are not to be regimented, nor to meet any where but at church every Sunday, to perform the manual and evolutions, with three fires executed in the quickeſt manner: for, as to charge and fire with expedition and dexterity, is the great aim of diſcipline; it ought to be uſed conſtantly, either in platoons or otherwiſe, by all the orders of militia, as well as by the ſubordinate infantry. In like manner, the conſtant practice of all the evolutions will render the national militia expert at forming into every ſhape neceſſary to repel, or charge an enemy with advantage.

But becauſe ſome few pariſhes in the kingdom are not populous enough to furniſh a company ſufficient to perform thoſe exerciſes in a proper manner, the deputy-lieutenant of each hundred may, in ſuch caſe, be impower'd to join thoſe pariſhes together, or to a neighbouring pariſh of greater extent, ſo as to form a company

company numerous enough for all the purpoſes of diſcipline. Sect. 6.

SECT. VI.

Of the exerciſe of the militia, and expediency of annual camps ſucceſſively in every county.

THE manner of performing the exerciſes above-mention'd is ſo well known, and has been ſo long eſtabliſhed, as to render a preciſe detail unneceſſary: but it is a point worthy of conſideration, whether the manual exerciſe may not be s uſeful, tho' much ſhorter than at preſent; and whether, when a battalion is form'd three deep to give ſeveral fires, it is not moſt convenient, according to Colonel Blakeney's regulation, for the front rank to charge their firelocks in the ſame poſture of kneeling. But whatever forms of diſcipline may be eſtabliſhed, certainly the ſame ought to be obſerv'd univerſally throughout the whole national militia; that in caſe of

Part II. invaſion, when the militia of ſeveral counties is join'd into one army, the whole may act with greater force, by an exact uniformity of diſcipline.

Since the art of a ſoldier is generally taught in a very ſhort ſpace to the moſt aukward countrymen taken from the plow, it cannot be doubted that men of better education may become accompliſhed ſoldiers in much leſs time: and therefore it is no improbable concluſion, that the whole body of ſuperior militia may, by exerciſing once every month, become a regular army in one year after inſtitution, or much ſooner; if, by more frequent exerciſe, the national defence requires it.

But, that the Britiſh militia may arrive at the higheſt perfection in the art of war, it ſeems expedient, that the army of each county ſhould encamp alternately, for a week or ten days every ſummer, in ſome place the moſt open,

and

and neareſt the ſea; or in the centre of each county, according to its ſituation, near, or at a diſtance from the coaſts, where all the diſcipline of a camp may be learn'd; battles, ſkirmiſhes, ſieges, and every ſcene of war acted, as much to the real improvement, as entertainment of the army. Sect. 6.

For this purpoſe, all officers and ſoldiers, entitled to roll in the ſuperior militia of horſe, or foot, muſt be obliged by law to furniſh themſelves with tents and field-equipages, ſuch as the legiſlature thinks fit; the expence of which may be made eaſy, by four or ſix neighbours joining in the property of one tent, &c.

Those gentlemen of fortune, who are to furniſh the heavy cavalry, may alſo bear the expence of their tents and field-equipages; for it ſeems neceſſary that this body of horſe ſhould know all the duties of a camp, during the conti-

Part II. nuance of which each county muſt furniſh its own army with ammunition, proviſion and forage, by a county-rate, called ammunition and trophy tax, to be levied by the deputy-lieutenants of each county, or any ſix of them, authorized by the militia act ſo to do, in a manner moſt equal and proportionate, according to the preſent forms of county-rates. And, to render the army of each county more complete, it is neceſſary to eſtabliſh a regiment of pioneers of unmarried men, out of the ſubordinate infantry of that town or hundred where the alarm-poſt is appointed; which being incorporated, may chuſe its own officers by ballot out of the ſuperior infantry, in the manner before preſcribed. This regiment of pioneers may be allow'd a pay of ſixpence a day for each man, out of the ſame fund: for, as that order of people can ſupport themſelves by daily labour only, it ſeems juſt to allow them a ſmall pay during the encampment.

Sect. 6.

To render the national militia more formidable, it is alſo neceſſary, that the army of each maritime county be provided with a good train of artillery at the national expence, to be reſerv'd in an houſe near the magazine of ammunition, to be built for theſe purpoſes in the moſt convenient part of the county, as near as poſſible to the alarm-poſt; which ought to be appointed at ſome conſiderable town, where the men may be well accommodated, as near the ſea-coaſts as poſſible, and populous enough to furniſh a large artillery-company, who, beſides the common exerciſe of the firelock, may be taught all the arts of engineering, by firing cannon and mortars at butts erected for that purpoſe. As there is no branch of the art of war more neceſſary for national defence, ſo none ought to be more encouraged; and yet I am ſorry to ſay it, nothing is here more neglected.

Part II.

SUCH a train of artillery may conſiſt of 4 mortars and 20 * field-pieces, like thoſe now in uſe among the Germans; which are of leſs expence, and of more ſervice than heavy cannon, becauſe more eaſily drawn from place to place, as ſudden occaſion may require.

SECT. VII.

Propoſal for incorporating the officers of our preſent army, with the national militia; and to continue them in full pay for life.

FOR the better diſciplining the national militia, and at the ſame time to do juſtice to the officers of our army upon the preſent eſtabliſhment, it ſeems right

* This kind of artillery is much improved by Mr. Robins the mathematician, by decreaſing the weight, and increaſing the bore, ſo as to diſcharge a larger ball, or more partridge-ſhot in proportion, than thoſe now in uſe: theſe field-pieces, being open at the breech at the time of loading, are leſs ſubject to heat by repeated diſcharges, and charged with more expedition.

right to incorporate them with the mi- Sect. 7.
litia of each diſtrict, where their general
reſidence is, and to continue them in full pay during life, but without ſucceſſors: ſince all that expence to the publick may be ſaved by the eſtabliſhment of a well-regulated militia.

As theſe officers are ſuppoſed maſters of diſcipline, it is juſt they ſhould take poſt in precedence of all militia officers of the ſame rank: thus generals of the preſent army take poſt of thoſe appointed by the King out of the militia: ſo a colonel takes the right of him who is elected colonel of the regiment of the hundred; the lieutenant-colonel of his fellow, the major of his, and the captain of his: for, a firſt and ſecond officer of the ſame rank, and in the ſame corps, conſiſt as well together in the land as ſea-ſervice; and a ſubordination may be preſerv'd, as well in the ſame rank, as in different orders, provided the officer,

Part II. cer, who takes poſt to the right of his fellow, has alſo the command of him.

But becauſe the national militia of this kingdom will conſiſt of more regiments than our preſent army, it is propoſed that one officer only in pay ſhall be enrolled in each regiment of the militia by the king's allotment; and that all ſubalterns now upon the eſtabliſhment ſhall be continued in full pay, and be poſted by the king's appointment in different pariſhes, as far as their preſent number extends, to inſtruct the infantry of ſubordinate militia of each pariſh in the art of diſcipline.

In like manner all the ſerjeants and corporals now in pay may be continued, and cantoned as far as their number extends, one in every hundred, to aſſiſt the officers of ſuperior militia in teaching the military exerciſe.

SECT.

Sect. 8.

SECT. VIII.

Propoſal for incorporating all officers of the navy with the militia of the diſtrict where their general reſidence is.

THE navy of Great Britain is without all doubt its preſent bulwark againſt foreign invaſion, and will always be the only protection of its navigation and commerce: Therefore it is good policy to give all poſſible encouragement to ſea-officers, by continuing them in conſtant full pay, provided they are alſo incorporated with the militia of the diſtrict where their general reſidence is, upon the ſame foot with the land-officers above-mentioned; computing the precedence of rank among them according to priority of commiſſion; as the precedence of militia-officers muſt be computed from the firſt election, a certificate whereof may be always given by the deputy-lieutenant of the hundred, where each officer is firſt elected.

Part II.

THIS inſtitution of incorporating all ſea-officers with the national militia, is probably the beſt means of advancing the intereſt and glory of this kingdom; becauſe, by learning the military art, they may become as well qualified to conduct armies, as fleets.

IT has been the misfortune of this nation, in the firſt inſtitution, to ſeparate abſolutely the ſea and land ſervice; ſo that there is hardly a ſingle inſtance of one accompliſhed in both. The ill ſucceſs of all our expeditions, where land and ſea forces in conjunction were neceſſary, has been owing principally to that cauſe; but when our ſea-officers are as well qualified by military diſcipline for both ſpheres, we may expect to ſucceed in ſuch enterprizes, at leaſt as well as the French; for whatever may be preſumed in favour of land-officers, it is certainly more eaſy to learn their art, than that of a ſea-commander:

nor

nor is it a groundleſs ſpeculation, to be- Sect. 8.
lieve that thoſe who have often com-
bated the dangers of the ſea, and been long inured to fatigue, are beſt able to bear the toils and hazards of a camp. Upon all accounts therefore it is moſt expedient that the Britiſh ſea-officers ſhould be train'd and well ſkilled in the art of war practiſed at land; as, by the help of a more liberal education than is conſiſtent with the preſent rules of ſervitude in the navy, they may be qualified to command both land and ſea forces, upon any foreign expedition, without the fatal interruptions attending a joint, or incompatible command. For though the ſkill required in a ſea commander is of a more extenſive kind than the mere ſcience of diſcipline at land; yet certainly it cannot be neceſſary for attaining it, to ſend a young gentleman on board, at the age of 15, a companion for foremaſt-men, and ſecluded from all means of a liberal education. The greateſt ſea-commander this nation

can

Part II. can boaſt of (Blake) was educated at Oxford as a ſcholar, and from thence became a land-ſoldier, before he apply'd himſelf to the ſea. Might not our navy therefore be conducted by men of greater accompliſhments, if thoſe of education, inſtructed in all the previous knowledge requiſite, might be admitted as officers, after two years ſervice?

SECT. IX.

The manner of inforcing diſcipline in a national militia.

We are often told by modern ſoldiers, that military diſcipline cannot be well eſtabliſhed without the utmoſt ſeverities of corporal puniſhment, to which I confeſs no freeman ought to ſubmit: for whenever ſocieties conſtantly ſubject themſelves to the laſhes of martial law, they become real ſlaves; and, in this ſenſe, all the mercenary armies of the world are no better than ſlaves to the will

will and power of him who pays and directs them. Sect. 9.

THESE methods of eſtabliſhing military diſcipline are juſtly deteſtable to free-born Britons, and not leſs foreign to the intention of this plan, which propoſes all the encouragements of example, emulation, and reward; and no other puniſhment but pecuniary fines, with the penalty uſual in caſe of non-payment: for theſe, and theſe only, are the means of enforcing military diſcipline, conſiſtently with publick liberty.

As the example of the great has ſuch powerful influence over all nations in things indifferent, or perhaps criminal, and contradictory to reaſon; how efficaciouſly muſt it operate in caſes where publick happineſs is the obvious reſult? National honour, ſelf-preſervation, the ſecurity of property againſt ambitious invaders, all conſpire with united force to engage great men to promote diſcipline in the militia by their own example.

Part II. ample. And if men of quality and fortune once take delight in martial exerciſes, they muſt very ſoon become honourable, and the general faſhion. The crouds of fair ſpectators, who now attend horſe-races, to ſee the conteſts of thoſe animals in fleetneſs, muſt receive higher and more rational entertainment, from the pomp of war, and the competition of gentlemen in the arts of diſcipline, ſo evidently conducive to the publick felicity. Shews of that kind, beſides the preſent pleaſure of viſion, ariſing from order and magnificence under the conduct of valour, fill the mind with pleaſing reflections on the preſent publick ſafety, and the future ſtability of national proſperity. Induſtry itſelf cannot blame the loſs of time ſpent in exerciſes ſo neceſſary, provided they do not interfere with the labours of harveſt.

But leſt the power of example may not prevail, let all the incentives of emulation,

lation, and even pecuniary rewards be added to inforce a regular military diſcipline: A diſtinguiſhing cockade, or ſome ſuch trophy, may excite many to a rivalſhip; as a medal, or piece of money given to the man in each company, who ſhoots beſt at a target, or exerciſes with moſt dexterity, may be more acceptable to others, than rewards merely honorary. Sect. 10.

SECT. X.

The manner of inforcing diſcipline by fines.

But as neither example, honorary, nor pecuniary rewards, can prevail upon low and ſordid diſpoſitions, abandon'd to ſloth and indolence, it is very reaſonable, they ſhould pay a fine for every neglect of military duty, the rates of which are propoſed in the following table, with entire ſubmiſſion to better judgment.

Part II.

A TABLE of MILITARY FINES.

The Fines of all officers refuſing to accept militia offices into which they are elected.

THE deputy-lieutenant of each hundred, appointed by the lord-lieutenant's commiſſion, refuſing to act, forfeits	l. 50	0	0
All field-officers elected,	20	0	0
All captains elected,	10	0	0
All ſubaltern officers elected,	5	0	0
The treaſurer of each hundred, elected by the court martial thereof,	20	0	0
The ſecretary, or regiſter of the court martial and court of honour, elected,	5	0	0

The

Sect. 10.

The Fines of officers for neglects of duty, when in office.

THE deputy-lieutenant, for every neglect of duty prescribed by act of parliament, forfeits l. 5 0 0

The field-officers, for absence on the days of exercise, neglects of holding monthly courts martial, or courts of honour, and for every other neglect of duty prescribed by act of parliament, 3 3 0

Captains for the like defaults, 2 2 0

Subalterns for the like defaults, 1 1 0

The treasurer of the hundred, for every default, 1 1 0

Secretary of the court martial, or court of honour, for every default, 0 10 6

Part II.

Fines of all private ſoldiers of the ſuperior and ſubordinate militia, who refuſe to enroll their names in their reſpective pariſh muſter-roll at the time appointed by the deputy-lieutenant.

EACH private trooper, qualified to roll in the ſuperior cavalry, l. 10 0 0

Each of the ſuperior infantry, 5 0 0

Each of the ſubordinate infantry, 0 10 0

All perſons required by the militia to furniſh troopers to the ſubordinate cavalry, in proportion to their fortunes, who neglect to enroll the names of ſuch troopers in every muſter-roll of the pariſh where their chief reſidence is, ſhall forfeit yearly,

for

for each trooper wanting of his quota, 20 0 0 Sect. 10.

The Fines of all private ſoldiers in the militia, for defaults in attending exerciſe, keeping their arms in good order, complying with the uniform, and for all other neglects of military duty required by law.

THE private troopers of the ſuperior cavalry, for each default forfeits l. 2 2 0

The private ſoldiers of the ſuperior infantry, 1 1 0

The private ſoldiers of the ſubordinate cavalry, 0 5 0

The private ſoldiers of the ſubordinate infantry, 0 2 6

The Fines of peace-officers, for neglects of duty preſcribed by the act of militia.

MINISTERS and church-wardens, for each default	l.	5	0 0
The high conſtable of each hundred,		5	0 0
The petty conſtable and tything-men of each pariſh,		1	0 0

The annual tax of quakers and papiſts, in lieu of perſonal ſervice.

THOSE qualified by fortune to roll in the ſuperior infantry, per annum,	l.	12	12 0
Thoſe qualified for the ſuperior cavalry, per annum,		25	4 0
Thoſe for the ſubordinate infantry, per annum,		1	10 0

Thoſe

Sect. 11.

Thoſe qualified by eſtate to furniſh troopers to the ſubordinate cavalry are to do ſo, or pay the ſame fines required by law from all other delinquents of the like kind, and in the ſame proportion.

All fines are firſt demandable by the treaſurer of the hundred, by virtue of an order from the court martial; but, in caſe of refuſal, he returns the liſt, with a certificate thereon, to the court martial, which certifies the ſame to the deputy-lieutenant of the hundred, who thereupon iſſues his warrants of diſtreſs: and, after recovering the ſaid fines, deducts 5 l. per cent. for his trouble, and pays the remainder to the treaſurer of the hundred, who is alſo to be allowed 5 l. per cent. for all money iſſued by him, according to order, or by virtue of his office.

Part II.

ALL officers; and, if required, all ſoldiers of the ſuperior and ſubordinate militia, ſhall take the oaths of allegiance and ſupremacy, when tender'd by the deputy-lieutenant of each hundred; or, in caſe of refuſal, pay the ſame tax required by law from papiſts, and to be diſqualified from bearing arms in the militia.

SECT. XI.

The manner of levying fines upon all delinquents in military duty.

IF any man qualified to ſerve in either order of the militia, ſhall refuſe or neglect to enroll, or do military duty according to act of parliament after liſting, he is juſtly fineable. But yet that fine ought to be levied in a manner the leaſt inconvenient. Therefore at the firſt meeting of the militia, after the election of field-officers, an exact enquiry ſhall be made by all the officers

of every corps, (who are to be conſti- Sect. II.
tuted the court martial of each hundred) into delinquents of all ſorts, a liſt of whom ſhall be drawn out, diſtinguiſhing the reſpective pariſhes of their reſidence, and a certificate thereof annexed, and return'd under the hands of any three officers of each regiment, (one of which muſt be a field-officer) to the deputy-lieutenant of the reſpective hundred, who, being authorized by law, ſhall iſſue his warrants to levy the legal fine upon each delinquent, according to the nature of the offence.

And this manner of proceeding is to be obſerv'd with reſpect to the whole ſuperior militia of horſe and foot, the deputy-lieutenant being always obliged to ſpecify in his warrant, the offence, the offender's name, and the ſum to be levied by the conſtable, or tything-man of each tything, upon the goods and chattels of each delinquent; to ſell the ſame at publick outcry in ſix days after the

Part II. the levy is made, paying the fine to the deputy-lieutenant of the hundred; and, after deducting one ſhilling in the pound for his trouble, the ſurplus muſt be return'd to the owner, or proprietor of the goods levied on.

In like manner all fines are to be levied on the goods and chattels of delinquents in the ſubordinate militia, by virtue of the deputy-lieutenant's warrant, grounded upon the joint certificate of the captain, lieutenant, and enſign of each company; but in caſe no goods nor chattels can be found, then the delinquent is to be committed to the common goal of the county, by warrant under the hands and ſeals of the deputy-lieutenant, and the commanding officer of the corps, whereof the delinquent is a member, for ſuch time as the act of militia ſhall preſcribe. And all the fines of the ſuperior and ſubordinate militia return'd to the deputy-lieutenant of the hundred, are by him to be paid over

to

to the treaſurer of the hundred for the time being, who is to be choſen by the officers of ſuperior militia, horſe and foot, by ballot, at the firſt day of exerciſe after their own election of officers is over. And the ſaid treaſurer of the hundred ſo choſen, ſhall accept, and do the duty of that office, for three years, under the penalty preſcribed by law, to be levied by diſtreſs, and ſale of his goods, by virtue of the deputy-lieutenant's warrant as aforeſaid; which forfeiture ſhall be paid to the ſucceeding treaſurer of the hundred. Sect. 11.

BUT, as the treaſurer of each hundred is ſubject to ſome trouble in the execution of his office, he ought therefore in reaſon to be exempted from all other unprofitable offices, civil or military, by expreſs words in the act of militia.

FOR the ſame reaſon the deputy-lieutenant of each hundred ought to be excuſed from all other unprofitable offices, civil

Part II. civil or military; and the fine to which each deputy is ſubject for neglecting or refuſing his office, may be levied upon his goods and chattels, by virtue of a warrant under the hand and ſeal of the lord-lieutenant of the county, directed to the high ſheriff, or his deputy; which fine is to be returned to the treaſurer of the hundred where it is levied, for the uſe of the militia.

The treaſurer of each hundred ſhall not iſſue, or pay any ſum of money, but by a written order, under the hands of the preſident, and two other members of the court martial of each hundred; except for powder, bullets, and the expence of making cartridges, of which an ample ſtore is to be provided at the diſcretion of the treaſurer, in the magazine of the hundred, to be built for that purpoſe, in the moſt convenient place, by the joint direction of the colonels, or commanding officers of the ſuperior militia of horſe and foot, with the conſent

and

and concurrence of the deputy-lieutenant and treaſurer of the hundred for the time being. Sect. 11.

But in caſe the deputy-lieutenant, the treaſurer of the hundred, or any other officer employ'd to levy fines, ſhall oppreſs, or treat unjuſtly any man; imbezzle, or miſapply any money; ſuch perſon ſo offending may be indicted by any officer of the hundred, at the next quarter-ſeſſions, and fined at the diſcretion of the juſtices: and, upon the certificate returned by the juſtices of the quarter-ſeſſions to the court of exchequer, proceſs may iſſue from thence to recover all ſums of money imbezzled, in the ſame manner by extent, or otherwiſe, as is uſual to recover the king's debts: which ſums of money, ſo receiv'd, muſt be paid over to the treaſurer of that hundred, to which it properly appertains, whoſe receipt ſhall be an abſolute diſcharge for all money paid to him by any perſon whatſoever.

SECT.

SECT. XII.

The eſtabliſhment of a court martial, and court of honour in each hundred.

As it is impoſſible to provide for every minute occurrence that may happen in eſtabliſhing and governing the militia, it ſeems neceſſary to erect a court martial, conſiſting of the two corps of officers, horſe and foot, of the ſuperior militia in each hundred, (ſubalterns excepted) with power to make regulations conformable to the general intention of the militia act; the majority of which officers (excluſive of ſubalterns) ſhall conſtitute a court martial of the hundred to all intents and purpoſes, as if all were preſent. The lord-lieutenant, deputy-lieutenant, and all generals of the county are always to be eſteem'd members of the court martial of every hundred, and may preſide there according to rank, whenever they attend: for, the commanding officer preſent, of whatever rank,

rank, is to preſide in each court mar- Sect. 12.
tial: and the perſon choſen out of the
ſubaltern officers, by a majority of voices of the court martial, ſhall act as the regiſter and ſecretary thereof, under the penalty preſcribed by law.

If, when a military ſpirit becomes general, it ſhall be ſuſpected, that the ſentiment of honour may run ſo high, as to increaſe among gentlemen the deteſtable practice of private vengeance by duel; and, if it be thought neceſſary for preventing this evil, the court martial may alſo be inſtituted a court of honour, with full power to adjudge, and finally determine all diſputes about precedence, affront, or otherwiſe, for the preſervation of peace, order, and diſcipline; but ſuch a court need not be furniſhed with any further power to enforce its decrees, than that of degrading from their military rank, whoever ſhall refuſe conformity to its deciſions.

The

THE juriſdiction of this court may extend to officers of all degrees, both in the ſuperior and ſubordinate militia, general officers excepted, who are to be tried only by their peers, in a court of honour to be appointed by the king. But the court of honour of each hundred, (which is alſo a court martial of the ſame diſtrict) muſt have power to examine, and paſs annually the treaſurer's accounts, who ſhall be abſolutely exonerated from all ſubſequent demands, upon accounts ſo paſſed, under the hands of the perſons then conſtituting that court.

SECT. XIII.

A tax upon all papiſts, by way of equivalent for perſonal ſervice in the militia, is juſt and reaſonable.

THO' it is probable that there are many good and faithful ſubjects among the papiſts of this kingdom, who would not

not change their liberrty, nor render their property precarious, by introducing tyranny, with their religion, into this country; yet, ſince thoſe cannot be diſtinguiſhed, by any certain criterion, from bigots of the Romiſh perſuaſion; and, ſince none of that ſect can, conſiſtently with their avowed principles, give this government ſuch teſtimonials of their allegiance as are required by its conſtitution, it is highly juſt and reaſonable not to truſt them with arms, as it is to oblige them to pay a tax in lieu of perſonal ſervice: for, as every member of ſociety owes that ſervice to the defence of the government from whence he derives protection and ſecurity; ſo he that yields it not, when able, either thro' indolence, or by adopting principles ſubverſive of the conſtitution, wilfully withholds his ſervice; and therefore ought to pay a tax equivalent to the fines which every other ſubject pays for neglect of military duty, in proportion to his fortune and condition in life. Sect. 13.

SECT. XIV.

The reaſonableneſs of levying the like tax upon quakers, who refuſe to contribute perſonal ſervice to the defence of their country.

QUAKERS in general are a peaceable, frugal, induſtrious people, and upon theſe accounts valuable members of ſociety: but, by holding obſtinately the principle of non-reſiſtance, they reſign every ſocial bleſſing to the firſt bold invader, and even invite publick deſtruction. In this reſpect the quakers and papiſts are alike injurious to ſociety; for if a government is ruined, it matters not by what hands, whether by foreigners unreſiſted, or by ſubjects ill affected. The papiſts therefore, who cannot be truſted with arms in a proteſtant government; and the quakers, who ſcruple to uſe them, notwithſtanding the primary law of ſelf-preſervation, ought in juſtice to contribute a tax equivalent

to the perſonal ſervice of other ſubjects, in proportion to their fortune and condition, as all others muſt do, who wilfully withhold their perſonal aid from the publick defence. Sect. 15.

SECT. XV.

The application of all fines to military uſe.

1. IT hath been ſaid before, that the treaſurer of every hundred may ex officio furniſh the magazine with powder and balls ſufficient for the whole militia of his diſtrict; ſome part of the fines may be therefore apply'd principally to that purpoſe, after the militia has been eſtabliſhed.

2. THESE fines may alſo be applied to the purchaſe of habiliments for the whole militia, ſuperior and ſubordinate; ſuch as half-pikes, partizans, halberts, ſtandards, kettle-drums, trumpets, drums, and colours, for every company in the hundred, which may be diſtinguiſhed from each other by diverſification of

Part II. colours, or devices, which are deſcriptive of the pariſh to which they belong. In the mean while, cockades of different colours may be provided for the ſubordinate militia, horſe and foot, ſuitable to their enſigns, by which each regiment of the county, and each company of ſubordinate foot may be diſtinguiſhed from others.

That all theſe ſhould be provided out of the fund ariſing from fines, and the tax of papiſts and quakers, ſeems reaſonable, becauſe, by the annual election of officers, frequent * rotations will happen, and all theſe inſtruments and enſigns of war may be kept ready for the uſe of each regiment and company, without

* The rotation of military offices may be objected to, as contrary to modern practice; but the wonderful ſucceſs of the Roman armies proves it abſolutely right. The Romans, without doubt, affected glory and command as much as other people, but yet they diſdained not to obey in their armies the ſame perſons whom they had formerly commanded; and to ſerve as private ſoldiers, where they had been formerly generals.

without putting the officers to a new expence upon every change of ſtation. Sect. 15.

3. Out of the ſame fund the charge of beacons may be ſupplied, and theſe fixed by appointment of the deputy-lieutenant, and treaſurer of each hundred, upon the higheſt hill, or moſt conſpicuous place of each diſtrict, by which the alarm may be ſoon conveyed round the whole kingdom.

In Switzerland the common method of giving the alarm is by lighting an heap of ſtraw in the day-time, or a pile of wood at night; but an empty pitch-barrel erected upon a bar of iron faſten'd to a pole, may anſwer all the purpoſes at a leſs expence, until the fund is ſufficient to build ſmall ſtone towers, and to buy two field-pieces, which may give the alarm, and be of uſe to the corps of each hundred, when upon action.

The Germans are ſaid to provide two ſuch field-pieces for every regiment,

Part II. and it ſeems a fit example for us, ſince it renders a body of troops more formidable; and, by adding theſe to the artillery of the county, the whole army will, upon a junction, be amply provided.

4. But as it will be difficult to furniſh trumpeters and drummers, expert in their ſeveral arts, without hire, it may be preſumed this fund will be ſoon ſufficient to ſupply ſuch, to each corps, at a moderate pay, to be ſettled and agreed by the court martial of each hundred, and conſtantly paid by the treaſurer for the time being.

5. Out of the ſame fund the treaſurer of the hundred may provide ſufficient quantities of cockades, made of ſilver, or gold ribband, to be conferred, as military rewards, on ſuch men as the commanding officer of each corps ſhall adjudge them to; or, if he ſees fit, inſtead of a cockade, the perſon meriting may have 2s. 6d. or 5s. as he ſhall appoint.

appoint. Such rewards, tho' of trifling expence, may be effectual incentives to military performances among the common people, as emulation and love of their country will be to all men of higher rank, and better education. Sect. 16.

SECT. XVI.

Military regulations for the city of London, and all other populous cities in the Britiſh dominions.

THE preceding regulations calculated for the militia of the kingdom in general, may ſerve for the cities of London and Weſtminſter, and all populous towns in the Britiſh dominions, except in the few inſtances following.

1. BESIDES the perſons qualified by eſtate to ſerve in the ſuperior cavalry, all ſuch as reſide in cities, and keep a riding horſe, or chaiſe-horſe, ſhould be obliged to conform to the eſtabliſhment of the ſuperior cavalry, and do the duty of that ſtation.

2. In like manner all perſons, whoſe reſidence is in cities, and who keep a pair of coach-horſes, whether qualified by eſtate or not, ſhould be obliged to furniſh two troopers to the inferior cavalry, mounted, arm'd and accouter'd according to the eſtabliſhed uniform.

3. All houſe-keepers, (except ſuch as are before exempted, and the officers of the cuſtoms and exciſe) in every city, with their journeymen, and apprentices of age to bear arms, ſhould ſerve in the ſuperior militia of foot in perſon, and comply with the uniform eſtabliſhed by law.

4. All the reſt of the inferior people, ſuch as working mechanicks, porters, coachmen, carmen, &c. ſhould be rolled in the ſubordinate infantry, and do duty at their reſpective pariſh-churches every Sunday, in quarter parts, in the ſame manner as the common people of every county.

5.

5. But becauſe cities are ſo populous as to furniſh great numbers of men both to the ſuperior and ſubordinate militia, every pariſh may compoſe a regiment of each order, with liberty to elect officers for each corps, in the manner before preſcribed; and the ſuperior militia, with the ſubordinate cavalry, may perform their monthly exerciſes in any ſquare, or open place of parade, neareſt to their reſpective pariſhes. But as the church-yards of ſome pariſhes are too ſmall for drawing up, or exerciſing the ſubordinate foot; in ſuch caſes they may perform it before or after divine ſervice, in any open place neareſt their reſpective pariſh-churches, where the officers of each corps ſhall agree to appoint.

6. The city of London being the great repoſitory of the national treaſure, and principal port of navigation and commerce; the ſuper-intendency of its militia ſhould certainly be executed rather

Part II. ther by a joint commiſſion, as at preſent, than be intruſted to a ſingle perſon. Suppoſe then, that as this city among others, has the privilege of chuſing its own ſheriffs, it might alſo have the appointment of its lieutenancy; ſo far at leaſt as to have that commiſſion ſupplied out of perſons recommended to that office by a ſolemn election.

WHENEVER therefore an act of militia is paſſed, in conformity to this, or a better plan, it is to be wiſhed that the corporation of London may be authorized and required to ſelect annually, by a majority of votes, in the way of ballot, 24 men; whoſe names being certified under the city-ſeal, and preſented to his Majeſty by the hand of the recorder, he may chuſe ſuch as he pleaſes to conſtitute a court of lieutenancy, conſiſting of 12 members, by whoſe prudence and vigilance the militia of London may become a well-diſciplin'd army of 200,000 men: an army of itſelf numerous

merous enough, if well train'd, to ren- Sect. 16.
der our capital invincible.

7. As this lieutenancy is to exercise all the powers with which the lords-lieutenants of counties are invested, so it is necessary this court should be authorized and required by the militia act, to appoint deputy-lieutenants for each ward of the city, subject to the same duties, and under the like penalties with all other deputy-lieutenants of the hundreds.

8. But as magazines of powder are dangerous to cities, it seems proper that the Tower of London should be that city's magazine, from whence the ammunition may be conveniently distributed in small portions every week, or otherwise, as occasion may require. Near all other cities it is expedient to build small fortresses for the situation and safety of their several magazines and artillery. The city of London can want

Part II. want no other but the royal artillery commonly lodged in the tower; and the hamlets may continue to furniſh an artillery-company, as at preſent, to be exerciſed in all the arts of engineering, with more care and aſſiduity than hitherto.

9. GREAT cities are too populous to be drawn into one camp at a moderate expence, but yet it is expedient their ſuperior militia ſhould be in ſome meaſure expert in all the neceſſary preparations for publick defence: and therefore it is propoſed, that one quarter part of the ſuperior militia of London and Weſtminſter, with the like portion of inferior cavalry, be encamped by rotation and lot, upon Black-heath for one week, at the moſt leiſure ſeaſon of every ſummer. In leſs populous cities and towns, where the ſuperior militia exceeds not five thouſand men, the whole body of horſe and foot will form but

but a ſmall army, and a moderate encampment. Sect. 16.

WITH theſe few variations it is preſumed the preceding plan may be adapted to cities and populous towns, as well as to all the counties of this kingdom: and if the legiſlature approves, and puts it in execution, it is to be wiſhed the law may extend to every part of the Britiſh dominions, where it is practicable; more eſpecially to our provinces, and great cities of North America, ſituated near a reſtleſs, enterprizing neighbour, now at enmity, whoſe intereſt it is to ſubdue by fraud or force, all thoſe countries lying between his dominions and the ſea; and conſequently obſtruct the increaſe of his navigation and commerce. For preventing therefore ſuch fatal incroachments on the Britiſh dominions, no means can be ſo effectual as the eſtabliſhment of a general militia well train'd to arms in all thoſe provinces, where the

Part II. the governor of each may be inveſted with the ſame powers, which are exerciſed by the lords-lieutenants of counties in this kingdom.

It muſt be obſerv'd however, that this ſcheme is not ſuitable in all points to our ſugar iſlands, Jamaica, Antigua, St. Chriſtopher's, Montſerat, and Nevis; becauſe none of them are peopled with white inhabitants proportionate to their extent, and blacks are not to be truſted with arms. Thoſe iſlands therefore muſt have the aid of ſome mercenary forces added to their reſpective militias, as well for preſerving their ſafety within, as to guard them from petty incurſions of a near and more powerful neighbour: but ſuch a joint force is not ſufficient to defend them againſt a general invaſion, which the French will moſt probably attempt; becauſe upon the poſſeſſion of thoſe colonies, ſo happily ſituated for the protection of the whole Britiſh navigation and commerce to America, and

for

for diſtreſſing the French, depends the empire of thoſe ſeas. Strong fleets therefore properly, and conſtantly ſtationed at the ſugar colonies, are the only infallible means of preſerving thoſe moſt valuable poſſeſſions, and of reducing the maritime power of France. Sect. 16.

How uſeful, how neceſſary indeed a general militia is for the kingdom of Ireland, and the great city of Dublin, every man of ſenſe there will diſcern at firſt ſight, who conſiders how much his country is expoſed to invaſion, from its numerous unfortified harbours, and deep ſhores; and what encouragement a popiſh enemy has to invade a place abounding with people of the ſame religion, ready to favour an enterprize ſo conducive to their private intereſt, and to the extirpation of thoſe whom they judge hereticks.

The parliament of Ireland may probably think theſe points moſt worthy of con-

Part II. conſideration at this dangerous juncture, when no doubt they will have both his Majeſty's concurrence and encouragement, to inſtitute a national militia of proteſtants, ſo neceſſary to their interior ſafety, and to the preſervation of that valuable part of his dominions from exterior force.

And if a national militia is neceſſary to preſerve the provinces of this kingdom, how much more neceſſary is it to the ſeat of empire, which ought to have ſtrength enough, not only for its own defence, but to protect all the diſtant parts of its wide extended territories; eſpecially as they are expoſed to the attacks of a great and formidable enemy? an enemy envious of our happineſs, ever ready and watchful to exalt his power, and extend his commerce upon the ruin of this nation, which ſeems impoſſible to be prevented by any other means than that of a juſt and frugal adminiſtration, ſupported by a well-diſciplin'd national militia.

INTRODUCTION

By Major General Roy D. Keehn
President of the National Guard Association
of the United States (1934-5)

The Purpose of This Pamphlet

THE National Guard system has been adopted by Congress, yet is generally misunderstood. That it was the original conception of George Washington and his generals at the close of the Revolutionary War, would be news to most of our citizens. That the National Guard must furnish the bulk of our war army in the first months of a national emergency, also would probably be news to all but a few well informed persons. And that it is the great bulwark of the state governments in time of civil disorders, is generally misunderstood.

The national tragedies involved in the development of the old militia into the highly organized, equipped and trained force of today, are unknown, except to those students of American history who have delved into the manuscript records of the Congressional Library in Washington. A knowledge of this phase of our history is essential to an adequate understanding of our military system today—and of its necessities.

The accompanying article, by Professor James Weber Linn, University of Chicago, epitomizes the drama and the tragedies of our past military system—or lack of system—and makes clear the sound basis on which the present National Guard of the United States is organized. It also clearly indicates the importance of intelligent support for the further and necessary development of the existing Guard organization.

* * * * *

The National Guard Association at its annual meeting in 1934, after much discussion, passed certain resolutions directing the President of the Association, and the Executive Council and Legislative Committee, to bring to the attention of the Congress and others, the urgent necessities of the Guard requiring immediate remedial action.

A digest of the more important of these resolutions appears as an appendix to this pamphlet.

We lack sufficient numbers to meet our present responsibilities. A very small increase would add immeasurably to the efficiency of the National Guard on mobilization by completing the organization of the eighteen infantry divisions, and by increasing its ability to meet civil disorders such as have recently threatened law and order in some states.

We lack seriously in allowances to maintain our men in decent uniforms, with proper equipment. A comparatively slight increase in appropriations would remedy this deficiency.

We lack the modern weapons and material with which foreign armies are provided. It must be admitted that this is a surprising situation, since we are the leaders of the world in the invention, development and manufacture of equipment of this nature. Our tank companies are about to be disbanded for lack of materiel. To send out American boys poorly equipped and supported with obsolete weapons would seem to be our present policy.

Our most serious lack is the understanding support of the average citizen, which I am sure would be accorded the National Guard were there a more general knowledge of the facts set forth in Professor Linn's brief account. I commend it to your thoughtful attention, and I appeal to you to assist us to help the nation and support the authority of the State governments.

Chicago, ROY D. KEEHN
January 12, 1935.

NOTE: Since the above was written in 1935, largely on account of the educational campaign conducted along the lines indicated therein, The Congress has appropriated funds to increase the National Guard by 5000 each in 1934 and 1935 and has included in the budget an appropriation for an additional 5000 increase for 1937. The War Department has recommended a total increase of 20,000. Congress has also, at the urgent request of the National Guard, modified the National Defense Act in many respects, strengthening the position of the Guard as an important cog in our National Defense machine and has created "The National Guard of the United States" as a Federal force which comprises the exact personnel of the National Guard of the various States and as such is subject to call by the President on action by Congress.

Our National Guard, therefore, now constitutes the largest, important part of the first line defensive force of the United States.
November 17, 1936. R. D. K.

Washington's Lost Plan Revived

NATIONAL GUARD TODAY THE PROPOSAL OF 150 YEARS AGO

BRITISH TROOPS DESTROY PLAN

Since this study was prepared in 1935 "A Plan for a National Militia in Great Britain" (1745) was presented to the Commanding General of the Illinois National Guard by and from the library of a distinguished citizen of Illinois, Colonel George Tracy Buckingham, of Chicago. This book, both in typographic format and binding, is a facsimile reproduction and has unusual historical value.

It is the hope of the Division Commander that a study of these two documents will stir your interest in, and appreciation of, the present National Guard set-up of your country.

R. D. K.

SUPPOSE war was declared between the United States and any other great power or powers—what would the President of the United States, who is the head of the military as of the civil power of the country, do?

He would call out the Guard.

There are fewer than sixty thousand Army "regulars" in the United States today. But in ten days, by the issuance of one key "emergency" order, close on to a quarter of a million members of the National Guard, trained soldiers, ably officered, with full equipment, could be brought together in any designated area of the country.

In 1917 it was necessary first to train officers to train soldiers. Today, though the body of the Army is even more of a "skeleton" than it was then, there are thousands of officers capable of taking charge of every sort of detail of organization, from the commanding of troops to the service of supply; a few of them paid, most of them unpaid, but ready. Every one of them knows just where he is supposed to go, just what he is supposed to do, in a major emergency. And every one of them knows too that the expansible, immediate line of military defense of the country in such an emergency is the National Guard. It was fifteen months before any mass of even partially trained troops were ready for mass action in 1918. Similar-sized bodies could be made ready today for mass action in less than fifteen days; and within six months the "millions" whom former Secretary of State Bryan optimistically visualized as "springing to arms" could be moulded into a truly effective nation on defense.

The Lost Plan of Washington

What, precisely, *is* the National Guard? Do you know? Not very likely. For few do know, outside of the members of the Guard itself, and Congress, and the officers of administration of the War Department and the Regular Army. And even in Congress, even extraordinary as it may seem among many members of the Guard itself, there is remarkable ignorance of its position on the national team, its precise place at the opening of the game, and particularly perhaps of its history.

And behind the present development of the National Guard there lies a strange tale of prevision and forgetfulness, one of the most dramatic examples in all military history of the folly of ignorance. It is the tale of how George Washington, assisted by the suggestions of his Generals, devised the plan for this development of the Guard, just as it is now worked out in principle; and how Washington's

plan was LOST in the archives, utterly forgotten, and unused for more than 125 years.

Had Washington's definition of American military policy in times of peace been accepted, had Washington's plan for a "peace establishment" been known and followed out, the whole military history of the United States would have been changed; many disastrous defeats might have been avoided, many expensive "victories" been made unnecessary; and in particular the worst horrors of war, the early horrors that inevitable accompany a lack of proper preparation, would have been greatly lessened, perhaps escaped altogether.

Enter the Prussian Drill Master

But the plan Washington advocated was ignored; it was not only put aside at first by Congress, but it was lost among the records for more than 125 years. The actual existence of Washington's plans was unknown when we fought the War of 1812; when we fought the Mexican War in the 1840's; unknown to Lincoln in 1861, to McKinley in 1898, and, believe it or not, unknown to Woodrow Wilson in 1917. Not till 1920, when our present National Defense Act was formulated and adopted, was Washington's plan put into force and made the basis of our peace-time military policy. And even then the plan was not re-discovered; it was re-invented. Actually not till 1928 was the following now famous letter found,[1] written in 1784 to Washington's beloved comrade in arms and Inspector-General from the days of Valley Forge to the end of the Revolutionary War, General Baron von Steuben:

"I have perused with attention the plan which you have formed for establishing a Continental Legion, and for training a certain part of the arms-bearing men of the Union, as a militia in times of peace; and . . . I very much approve of it. It was no unpleasing and flattering circumstance to me to find such a coincidence of ideas as appears to run through your plan and the one I had the honor to lay before a committee of Congress in May last . . . "

"A peace establishment ought always to have two objects in view; the one, present security of posts and stores, and the public tranquility; the other, to be prepared, if the latter is impracticable, to

(1) Foot Note: The letter referred to and the facts regarding the Washington-von Steuben plan for National Defense, herein described, were brought to light by General John McAuley Palmer (grandson of that Palmer of the same name who served as a Major General in the Civil War and later as Governor of Illinois and United States Senator, and was the nominee for President of the Gold Democrats in 1896.) The present General Palmer was the official military advisor of Senator James W. Wadsworth, Jr., Chairman of the Military Committee of the Senate in 1919-20, which drafted the present National Defense Act. The results of General Palmer's exhaustive researches are presented in his book *"Washington-Lincoln-Wilson, Three War Statesmen."*

resist with efficacy the sudden attempts of a foreign or domestic enemy . . . . While men have a disposition to wrangle and disturb the peace of society either from ambitious political or interested motives, common prudence and foresight require such an establishment as is likely to assure us the blessings of peace, although the undertaking should be attended with difficulty and expense; and *I can think of no plan more likely to answer the purpose than the one you have suggested*, which, *the principles being established,* may be enlarged or diminished at pleasure, according to circumstances. It therefore meets my approbation and has my best wishes for its success."

What was this plan which Washington so eagerly advocated, which was mislaid and overlooked for more than a century, which is now the basis of the National Military Defense? How does this plan relate to our present National Guard?

On April 14, 1783, General Washington had written suggestive letters to half a dozen of his ablest generals. The Revolutionary War had come to a close of victory for the Colonies a few weeks before. England had given up the struggle. We had won the privilege of forming ourselves into a nation. The army which had fought and conquered was about to be disbanded; its great Head was about to retire (he supposed permanently) into private life. As always, he was looking into the future. As always, one objective reached, he was considering the next. How to maintain what had been achieved? The letter he sent to General von Steuben reads as follows:

"My dear Baron:

"A Committee of Congress is appointed to consider what arrangements it will be proper to adopt in the different departments with reference to a peace.

"Colonel Hamilton (this was the famous Alexander Hamilton) who is Chairman of this Committee, has written me on this subject wishing to know my sentiments at large on such institutions of every kind for the interior defense of these States, as may be best adapted to their circumstances and conciliate security with economy and with the principles of our Governments.

"I wish therefore to be favored with your thoughts on this subject as soon as possible that I may compare them with my own and be able to comply with the request of the Committee in as full a manner and with as little delay as can be . . . . "

Von Steuben's Plan

Washington could not have imagined that "as little delays as can be" in taking advantage of von Steuben's views would magnify itself to one hundred and thirty-four years! And yet it was Baron von Steuben's scheme, not as he immediately formulated it but as he thought it out during the ensuing year, that roused Washington's "best wishes for its success."

Incidentally, it is extraordinary that von Steuben should have been the man to devise such a plan. For he had been a Prussian soldier under Frederick the Great, a man of regulations and forms, a drill-master par excellence, trained to belief in a centralized standing army and in that only. But coming to America to offer his services to the Colonies, he had not only done them an enormous service, but had himself become an admirer of democratic principles, a citizen of the New World in spirit as well as in fact. And so he became convinced that a large standing army of "regulars," or even a small standing army theoretically expansible to a large force in an emergency, was no solution of the problem of military defense in a democratic government. The solution, as Baron von Steuben worked it out, was in the formation and maintenance of a "well-regulated militia."

Notice the adjective. The whole force of the plan lies in it. A *well-regulated* militia.

In the idea of using militia in time of war there was nothing new. In fact, it was the use of militia, but ill-regulated militia, that had plunged the Colonies into despair, and almost into destruction, in the Revolutionary War just passed. An ill-regulated militia had been George Washington's own pet agony. "To place any dependence upon militia," Washington had written Congress in 1776, "is assuredly resting upon a broken staff." And later in the same year he wrote again, "Short enlistments and a mistaken dependence upon militia have been the origin of all our misfortunes and the great accumulation of our debt."

But von Steuben did not propose national defense by militia in war. He proposed the organization and maintenance of a *well-regulated* militia in peace-times, for the *prevention* of misfortunes and an accumulation of debt. Washington himself had thought out the same general conclusion; and he instantly recognized the soundness of the regulations in von Steuben's plan, so "coincident in ideas" with his own. A well-regulated and disciplined militia, he thereafter repeated again and again, is "the only palladium of a free people"; it must be considered as "the palladium of security, and the

first effectual resort in case of hostility."

Von Steuben estimated the numbers that might be required *for that time* at 21,000 men, expansible to 42,000 on mobilization. (Proportional figures for today would be about 300,000, expansible to 600,000 on mobilization). He proposed that the ranks be filled by enlisting volunteers for three years. Each of these young men was to be paid a small bounty, armed and uniformed at public expense, and called into training camps for one month of each year. The force was to be divided into localized units of 3,000 men each, to include two small brigades of infantry, a squadron of two troops of cavalry, a battalion of artillery of two batteries, and an organized field train. These seven divisions might be further reasonably separated into fourteen, thus making possible their billeting each in a small area.

The Stumblings of Ignorance

Such an organization was, when Steuben planned, unheard of anywhere. Switzerland had had compulsory citizen service for centuries, but this was different. A territorial military organization based on the distribution of population to facilitate nation-wide standardized military training, localized military units, and decentralized mobilization, was not perfected even in Europe till long after von Steuben had gone; and it was not adopted by us for 136 years! We drifted into the war of 1812, and nearly lost it, unhelped by the use of this utterly forgotten scheme. We plunged, North and South, into the War of the Rebellion, with neither section thus organized, and horrified the world and one another by our unpreparedness. Even when in 1914 it was sadly evident that we might be dragged into the World War, we still avoided reliance on von Steuben's, on Washington's pioneer but forgotten plan, though we had then three years to put it into nation-wide trial before the actual day of our entrance into the war came—and how many lives, how much money, we might have saved, if when we put our moral influence into the balance on the side of the Allies, we had had a physical influence that Central Europe did not and could not despise.

Why, even after the war with Spain, when the United States at last began to discover the folly of complete military unpreparedness for war, did none of our military experts, none of our statesmen, rediscover, or at least re-invent, the details of the Washington-von Steuben plan for national military defense? Why did we continue even then until after the World War to depend *primarily* upon the principle of an "expansible" regular army—expansibly by the pyra-

miding upon it, *base in air,* of millions of untrained and immediately untrainable volunteers?

British Soldiers Strike Young America a Deadly Blow

This is too long a story to tell here. Partly because of the worst single blow the British struck us in the War of 1812—the destruction of Washington's plan in the burning of the Capital in 1814. It was bad enough to lose the buildings of state; it turned out to be worse that the record of Washington's eager advocacy of von Steuben's plan of "territorial organization" should be lost. Had the First President's "approbation and best wishes" for that scheme been preserved and known to the country, the force of his reputation must have much earlier brought it into effect. Alas that the flames set by the British order should have consumed A GREAT IDEA, as well as merely wood and plaster!

But partly also, no doubt, because the United States has always been (and still is) reluctant to *think through* the matter of military defense—a generous, heterogeneous eagerly democratic nation, a nation of those "common people" whom Lincoln said the Lord loved, and who hate war so sincerely that we hate to think of the possibility of war at all. So in making plans for military defense, we have tended not to concentrate our best thoughts; we have approached the whole business, as it were, shamefacedly. For these and other reasons, historical, traditional, and psychological, we delayed our best judgment for more than a hundred years.

But now, under the National Defense Act of 1920, and as since amended, what is the place of the National Guard today? What system, and what details, have we finally arrived at?

It is a genuine mystery that so few in this country should know, even in general, the answer to this question. For make no mistake: the National Guard today is the FIRST LINE of military defense in this country; not the second line. In this whole country, from the northern tip of Maine to the southern tip of California, there are not sixty thousand "regulars." Whereas if in an emergency the President of the United States should order—as he has a right to order—the mobilization of the National Guard to any one area, nearly 300,000 could be assembled, equipped *and transported* to that area within ten days, no matter where that area might be, and trained for the job.

A little way back the question was asked, why after the Spanish War, at least did none of our military experts re-invent the Wash-

ington plan? The implication of that question is not wholly fair. After the Spanish War, which in spite of its brevity and decisiveness made the plight of *ill-regulated* militia in war-time glaringly apparent, one great step forward was taken. A president came on the scene famous as an outstanding hero in the confusion and mismanagement of the affair in Cuba. More fortunate still was his choice of a Secretary of War, whose great mind rose above the turbid waters of partisan politics, and mere local considerations. The "General Staff" was born, and the "War College" started under his personal direction. And the militia system was lifted from the low level of *mis*-regulation, at least towards the high plane of sound regulation, suggested by Washington and his generals during those fruitful weeks of consideration in the closing moments of the Continental Army of the Revolution.

First Steps in Revival of Washington's Plan

The State troops, known as the National Guard, were now placed, after a fashion under federal patronage. Types of organizations were specified by the central government, equipment and uniforms were issued, and pay and expenses were provided for a summer training period. The relationship in the matter of the Guard was made contractual, between the States and the Federal Government. The latter furnished stipulated supplies and money, provided the states maintained certain organizations, drilled and instructed according to Federal plans. As time went on, regular officers began to appear at the summer camps, from the newly organized staff college at Fort Leavenworth, to serve as instructors while fulfilling the requirements of the law ordering Federal inspections. Officers of the Guard began to seek assistance of the best talent of the Regular Army. Special camps were established as schools of instruction for officers only, no enlisted men attending.

In 1911 Congress authorized an increase in the strength of the officer corps of the Regular Army to provide "year round" instructors for the National Guard. Even "tactical divisions" were organized. On paper, it is true; but nevertheless for the first time in peace the great battle unit—the "division" of infantry, cavalry, field artillery, engineers and special troops—came into being in a "militia" organization. The still undiscovered plan of Washington was being approached; this was the first appearance in American history of General von Steuben's "team practice" in training. Too bad that the child should have been a foundling, exposed to the reproach attaching to unknown parentage!

For the World War came before the Washington plan was at all perfected, before the child was grown. No foundation of adequate arsenals of supplies, equipment and munitions had been created. There were still no trained staffs. A thousand and one items of necessary equipment for teaching were still lacking, from heavy guns to filing systems. Many an unfit officer had not yet been eliminated. Some states, providing their own funds, had developed a strong military organization; in others the regiments were hardly more than political or social units. But even though war pounces on the unprepared, American troops of the Guard fought with high courage and high honor on the great battle-fields of Europe. Eleven of the 29 divisions deployed against the enemy were from the National Guard. They stormed the Hindenburg Line, crossed the Meuse in the face of the foe, fought in the Argonne, helped to clip off the St. Mihiel salient.

The Almost Fatal Delays in 1917-18

When? The when was the rub. Fifteen months elapsed after the declaration of war before any sizable bodies of troops were even partially ready for the conflict. Fifteen months! The other day the War Department carried out certain military exercises in New Jersey, on the basis of the actual conditions which would have to be met were America opposed by a group of hostile powers. National Guard troops were moved directly from their armories in the Middle West to New Jersey, detrained, and marched all night, to deploy at dawn in strange country, as densely overgrown as the Argonne, and attack immediately! No fifteen months of training available here. In the plans, there were not even fifteen minutes allotted for training; every hour, every quarter hour, was absorbed in mobilizing, concentrating, marching or deploying. True, in these exercises only the staffs were actual; the men themselves were theoretical. There was no money for the movement of the actual troops. But the actual troops *were available;* and but for economic reasons *could have been* mobilized, transported and fought in the same way and in the same period of time.

What has happened in the development of the National Guard since the World War?

Under the provisions of the National Defense Act of June, 1920, and as amended, the whole status, organization, equipment and training of the National Guard has been changed. The entire military system of the United States has been made an effective nucleus for a genuine "citizen army," for a *well-regulated* militia, closely following the lines proposed by Washington and von Steuben. As-

tonishing, is it not, that when the National Defense Act was passed, the Washington plan should still have remained undiscovered; that when it was finally found it should confirm with amazing prevision every detail of the present system? One hardly knows which of those two things is the more incredible; yet both are true.

The Present Military Set-Up

The National Defense Act provides for adequate higher staffs of Regular Army officers, an adequate Regular force for the initial defense of the Panama Canal and Hawaii, a small Regular expeditionary force, *and Regular officers and enlisted personnel to serve as instructors for the other components of the National Army.*

The second component is the National Guard.

The third component is formed of the Organized Reserves—a purely skeleton organization in times of peace, but capable, as we shall see, of being made immediately effective on the outbreak of any hostilities; for the "skeleton" has a vital and tremendous *brain.*

The supplement of these components is the R.O.T.C. and the C.M.T.C., under Regular Army supervision, providing the peacetime schools for producing officer material, and gradually replacing the men of war experience.

Our immediate war army, in a major emergency, would consist of approximately 20 percent regulars and 80 percent National Guard troops. Note the proportions. Eventually, but far more rapidly than in 1917 and 1918, this immediate army would be completed by a million and a half, or as many more as needed, of men drawn into the ranks of the existing skeleton organizations of the Reserve force. In not more than six months, this Reserve force would be fully ready for service.

Now, what is the basis, the principle, of the second component, the National Guard?

The National Guard is enlisted by the *states.* The National Defense Act provided that the number of enlisted men (in the first year) shall be "for each state in the proportion of 200 for each Senator and Representative in Congress from such State . . . and shall be increased each year thereafter in the proportion of not less than 50 percentum until a total peace strength of not less than 800 enlisted men for each Senator and Representative in Congress shall have been reached." This permits approximately 450,000 as a peacetime strength. There are actually about 185,000 today. Later, in this article, the particular deficiencies in the present strength will receive further consideration.

National Guard Truly Representative of the People

These troops are enlisted from, and drilled in, the communities of their respective states. They are available, under the state executives, for service within their states. But they are paid, uniformed, and equipped by the Federal Government, and their training is assisted by Regular Army officers and non-commissioned officers on duty with every regiment, brigade and division. They are organized into tactical divisions, camped every summer at Federal expense, and inspected in detail twice a year by boards of Regular Army officers to determine whether or not the prescribed standards for training, organization and equipment are maintained. And in accordance with these contractual obligations of the Federal Government, finally settled in 1933, the neighborhood State troops are now subject to instant call by Congress and the President of the United States, and can be made immediately available for service. It will be seen at once that by this arrangement the Guard is both local *and* national. Divided, it would fall; united, it stands. It is an organization wholly compatible with our democratic institutions, and yet admirably suited to our national military necessities *should they arise.* The partnership between Washington and the States is made intimate; while the interest of communities in the husbands and sons in the local military unit remains direct and personal. The whole is closely knit into a great system of organization and supervision, and yet the democracy of the Guard is unimpaired.

The National Guard is organized into 18 infantry divisions and 4 cavalry divisions. The Infantry Division is the great battle team —infantry, tanks, artillery, aviation, engineers, signal and special troops, medical personnel and supply trains. The Cavalry Division is a smaller organization, similar in many respects, but with cavalry regiments in place of infantry. The Commanding Generals of the nine territorial areas of the Federal military establishment exercise constant supervision over the training and equipment of the various divisions of the Guard, and keep up to date their plans for its instant emergency mobilization and recruitment. The great Corps Area supply depots carry the additional equipment to bring the Guard to a war basis. The Corps Area staffs and the National Guard Divisional Staffs are well known to each other. Daily there is a Regular Army officer in touch with every regiment of State troops, and others on duty at each local division headquarters. And yet, *except in a national emergency,* the troops are wholly "militia" —that is, wholly local STATE troops, appealing to local pride, and

serving, directly, day in and day out, year in and year out, local and state interests! "Our Guard is not to be disturbed by the Federal Government in time of peace." This is the effective, this is the democratic, this was the GEORGE WASHINGTON method for maintaining a real military force for local and national defense.

Does not your knowledge of history and any recollection of the methods followed by nations in declaring war, as in February 1904, and August 1914, indicate that in the event of a future war the United States would not be given months, or even weeks, in which to make initial preparations; that in war the OUTSET COUNTS?

Present Deficiencies Demand Attention

Beyond any doubt the principle on which the organization of the National Guard rests is unassailable. But that principle is not being put into effect quite as its importance demands. None of its divisional organizations, for instance, are complete. Of the Infantry divisions, all lack various parts essential to their employment in campaigns. Only one division has its full complement of artillery. One division has no engineer regiment, others lack various companies of engineers. No division has its required complement of special troops or trains. Only one division has its full medical regiment. And so on. The eighteen Infantry Divisions are said by experts to vary in completeness of organization from 90% to 76%, and the situation of the Cavalry divisions is still worse.

Further, except for two weeks at or enroute to and from camp, only 72 hours of training per year are provided for. It has even been proposed seriously to cut down the number of paid drills ($1.00 a drill) per year to 12. And this in spite of the fact that almost forty percent of the Guard members were in 1934 out of regular employment, and many of them even lacked carfare to come to the drill halls. Congress cut in 1933 by 50% the maintenance allowance for keeping uniforms repaired and clean. The States constantly looked to the Guard, and frequently used it, to maintain order in cases of public disturbance—to the everlasting honor of the Guard, *both sides in any public quarrel generally welcoming their presence,* as in the instance of the Kohler riot in Wisconsin last August, when Governor Schmedeman was urged by the factory employers and employees alike, and by the Sheboygan municipal authorities, to keep the Guardsmen in Kohler Village as long as possible; or even more strikingly, in the coal-fields around Taylorville, Illinois, when both sides objected to the calling out of the Guard, and later were still more insistent that the Guard should not

be removed. The effect of this incompleteness of organization, and particularly of these small economies, for they are even in total very small, on the men is not good. It is not demoralizing, for the Guard as organized stands too firmly for demoralization; but it is distinctly weakening of morale.

Why is this Washington-principled territorial army, this first line of militia succor, this "cheap defense of the nation," as Burke called honor, not the pet and pride of the nation? There can be only on reason. The people of the nation do NOT KNOW much, they really know hardly anything about the National Guard. If knowledge could be substituted for ignorance, it seems almost certain that a wave of public opinion would sweep up to Congress, demanding that the plan of Washington, so long forgotten, so long needed, so recently put into force, the plan at once so democratic and so efficient, so state-serviceable and so nationally necessary should be finally and completely fulfilled.

[The End]

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